Sovereigns as Shareholders by Rose, Paul
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 87 | Number 1 Article 3
12-1-2008
Sovereigns as Shareholders
Paul Rose
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 83 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol87/iss1/3
SOVEREIGNS AS SHAREHOLDERS*
PAUL ROSE**
This Article considers the increasing impact of equity
investments made by sovereign wealth funds. Observers have
increasingly viewed sovereign investments with a high degree of
suspicion due to the potential for the investments to be used as
political tools rather than traditional investment vehicles. While
this risk is considerable, much of the discussion surrounding
sovereign investment ignores or minimizes the mitigating effect
of a number of regulatory, economic, and political factors. This
Article argues that continued vigilance, but not additional
regulation, is necessary to ensure that U.S. interests are not
jeopardized by sovereign investment in U.S. enterprises. While
the United States is able to protect its interests in domestic
markets, it is limited in the steps it can take to ensure that its
interests are not harmed by politically-motivated sovereign
investments in other countries. Many countries outside the
United States do not have the regulatory structure or political
power to adequately defend national interests. Due to the
potential political harms associated with sovereign investing, this
Article argues in support of the Santiago Principles, an
international code of conduct for sovereign investments.
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INTRODUCTION
International investment implicates much more than the flow of
cash and goods; considerable political issues are often at stake.1
Commerce may affect national security and may stoke national
pride.2 For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Japanese
investors turned from bidding on U.S. Treasury notes3 to purchasing
iconic U.S. businesses and properties, including the movie studio
MCA and the Pebble Beach golf course.4 These foreign investments
were a cause for alarm in the United States in part because the
1. "The relationship between international politics and international investment,"
says British economist John Kay, "is an issue as old as commerce." John Kay, Sovereign
Wealth Investment is a Force for Stability, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Feb. 27, 2008, at 11, available
at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/e3737986-e4d6-lldc-a495-0000779fd2ac.html.
2. As David Hume wrote over 250 years ago,
[n]othing is more usual, among states which have made some advances in
commerce, than to look on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye,
to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible for
any of them to flourish, but at their expence.
DAVID HUME, OF THE JEALOUSY OF TRADE, reprinted in HUME: POLITICAL ESSAYS, at
150 (Knud Haakonssen ed., Cambridge University Press 1994) (1752).
3. Japanese investors once purchased approximately forty percent or more of all
Treasury notes. See James Sterngold, Intractable Trade Issues with Japan, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 1991, at D1.
4. Id.
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Japanese operated under a more controlled, top-down form of
capitalism that created "not just a clash of cultures [but] a clash of
economic strategies, a competition of ideas."5  Yet, when the
Japanese turned their attention to other markets, especially mainland
Asia, the U.S. concerns shifted: "Japanese electronic goods and
automobiles will not disappear from American shelves or showrooms,
but increasingly they will come from factories in Asia, rather than in
Japan or the United States. That will mean less job creation in Ohio
or Tennessee, as the Japanese start up fewer new ventures in the
United States."6
Both concerns echo today with the rise of sovereign wealth funds
("SWFs")-generally defined as government investment vehicles
funded by foreign exchange assets and managed separately from
official reserves.7 The emergence of these funds has given rise to
several important questions. Are SWFs benign, long-term investors
that will add stability to global capital markets? Or, do SWFs
represent a new kind of state capitalism that threatens our national
security by allowing our political rivals access to and control of our
firms and technologies? As the United States attempts to protect
itself against such political investment, what are the consequences for
the United States if SWFs turn their attention to other markets?
SWFs have made a number of high profile acquisitions in recent
months. In 2007 alone, China's SWF, China Investment Corp.
("CIC"), purchased a 10% stake of private equity fund Blackstone
for $3 billion8 as well as $5 billion in convertible securities of
investment bank Morgan Stanley.9 Abu Dhabi's SWF, the Abu Dhabi
Investment Authority ("ADIA"), acquired $7.5 billion in convertible
securities of Citigroup,1 ° and Abu Dhabi's Mubadala Development
SWF acquired $700 million of stock in Advanced Micro Devices
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES, app. 3, at 1 (2007), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchange-rates/pdf/2007-
Appendix-3.pdf.
8. See Kate Linebaugh et al., China Puts Cash to Work in Deal with Blackstone,
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2007, at Al.
9. See Michael J. de la Merced & Keith Bradsher, Morgan Stanley Posts First
Quarterly Loss, and Welcomes Chinese Investor, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 19, 2007,
http://www.iht.com/ articles/2007/12/19/business/morgan.php.
10. See Nick Timiraos, Will Overseas Funds be a Juggernaut?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
2007, at All.
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(AMD).1" Borse Dubai acquired 20% of Nasdaq, 12 and Dubai World
purchased $424 million in MGM stock. 3 Two strategic SWFs,
Singapore's Government of Singapore Investment Corp. ("GIC")
and a Saudi Arabian fund, purchased $11.5 billion in convertible
securities from the Swiss bank UBS. 14  Temasek Holdings,
Singapore's other SWF, purchased $4.4 billion in Merrill Lynch stock
and then in 2008 received U.S. regulatory approval to increase its
stake in Merrill Lynch from 9.4% to 13.7%. 15 In early 2008, GIC
acquired a four percent stake in Citigroup for $6.88 billion, 6 while a
group of investors, led by SWFs Kuwait Investment Authority and
Korean Investment Corp., acquired around ten percent of Merrill
Lynch's stock for $6.6 billion.' 7
This list of acquisitions shows that SWFs are, in most cases,
formed by countries that receive large capital flows from the United
States through investment and trade in goods and commodities such
as petroleum. Some of the U.S. trade deficit with such countries is
offset through purchases of U.S. Treasury bills. Nearly 74% of U.S.
Treasury securities were held by foreign official institutions18 as of
11. See Lina Saigol & Chris Nuttal, Abu Dhabi's Mubadala Poised to Buy Up 9%
Stake in AMD, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Nov. 16, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
5cc6bf0c-94b2-lldc-9aaf-0000779fd2ac.html.
12. See Norma Cohen & Robert Anderson, Exchange Rivalries Usher in a New Era,
FIN. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at 19, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/o/7a2adb36-67db-
lldc-8906-0000779fdzac.html (describing the terms of Borse Dubai's acquisition of
Nasdaq).
13. See Chris Reiter & Steve Orlofsky, Dubai World Raises Stake in MGM Mirage,
REUTERS, Dec. 28, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSN284616
4220071230.
14. See Daisy Ku, Sovereign Fund Investments Surge in 2008-Dealogic, REUTERS UK,
Mar. 18, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/marketsNewsUS/idUKL1885212720080318
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (reporting on foreign investors' acquisition of equity in UBS).
15. Temasek Raises State in Merrill Lynch, REUTERS, Sept. 30, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/innovationNews/idUSTRE48T4FE20080930; see also Press
Release, Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Merrill Lynch Enhances Its Capital Position by
Raising Up to $6.2 Billion From Investors, Temasek Holdings and Davis Selected
Advisors (Dec. 24, 2007), available at http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695_7696_8149_
74412_86378_87784 (reporting the purchase of an initial "$4.4 billion in Merrill Lynch
common stock [with] the option to purchase an additional $600 million of Merrill Lynch
common stock by March 28, 2008").
16. Press Release, Gov't Inv. Corp. of Sing., GIC Invests USD 6.88 Billion in
Citigroup (Jan. 15, 2008), available at http://www.gic.com.sg[PDF/News%20Release%20-
%20GIC% 20invests%20USD%206.88bn%20in%2OCitigroup.pdf.
17. See Ku, supra note 14.
18. Foreign official institutions are defined as "government institutions involved in
the formulation of monetary policy, but also include national government-owned
investment funds and other national government institutions." U.S. DEP'T. OF
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June 2007, with approximately $479 billion held by China and $79
billion held by oil-exporting nations in the Middle East. '9 However,
China and other SWF sponsor countries have expressed interest in
putting their funds into equity instruments that may produce higher
yields. 0
As a general matter, SWFs, like other investment funds, have
sought returns on investment in the assets themselves, and thus far
have not made (or through the application of existing regulations,
have not been permitted to make) investments in the United States
for strategic political purposes. Examples of these purposes include
the acquisition of a company to attain sensitive technology or to
secure for a sovereign access, perhaps exclusive access, to particular
commodities or products. SWFs have generally refrained from
political investments even in countries that do not have legislation
comparable to the U.S.'s foreign acquisition regulations. However, a
number of features associated with SWFs have raised serious
concerns about their activities. While SWFs have existed for decades
with little notice or impact, the profile of SWFs has increased
markedly in recent years. SWFs are already a significant force in
global capital markets. There are approximately thirty-two sovereign
wealth funds in operation today. Ten of the largest have formed since
2000.21 By various estimates, these SWFs combined control assets
worth $2 to $3 trillion.22 SWFs are also expected to increase
significantly in the amount of assets under management. One
estimate predicts that within ten years SWFs could control over $13
trillion in assets. 3
The growth of SWFs in recent years is driven by several factors,
all of which suggest a continuing increase in the economic importance
TREASURY, REPORT ON FOREIGN PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES AS OF
JUNE 30, 2007, at 13-14 (2007), available at http://www.treas.gov/tic/shl2007r.pdf.
19. Id. at 10.
20. See, e.g., Keep Your T-bonds, We'll Take the Bank, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2007, at
75.
21. See EDWIN M. TRUMAN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS: THE NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2-
3, (2007), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf; see also GERARD
LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS 26 (Nov. 13, 2007), available at http://banking.senate.gov/
public/ files/ll1407_Lyons.pdf (listing the launch years of the top twenty-two largest
SWFs).
22. See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 45
(Oct. 2007) [hereinafter GFSR] (estimating that SWFs hold "between $1.9 trillion and
$2.9 trillion" of the "foreign assets held by sovereigns"); LYONS, supra note 21, at 1.
23. LYONS, supra note 21, at 9.
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of SWFs in the coming years. Standard Chartered, a UK bank that
published an influential report on SWFs in 2007, notes that
commodities price inflation has been important in the growth of
SWFs.24 Fifteen of the largest twenty funds depend on commodities,
particularly oil, as their main source of income.25 An excess in foreign
currency reserves has also led to growth in a number of SWFs,
including China's CIC. China has reserved some $1.8 trillion. 6
Standard Chartered speculates that China believes it needs only $1.1
trillion on reserve "to cope with any external shock," 27 and uses at
least some of the excess to fund CIC and other funds that invest in
equity instruments abroad. Thus, "[a]s reserves grow, it would be no
surprise if additional amounts were used in stages to swell the size of
China's SWF to, say, $600 billion within two years! ' 28
Another factor that causes SWFs to grow more quickly relative
to other sovereign accounts such as foreign currency reserves is that
SWFs are invested more aggressively. While currency reserves are
invested conservatively in order to ensure the availability of funds
(for such purposes as currency stabilization, for example), SWFs are
typically designed for growth.29
With the phenomenal growth of SWFs, each new SWF
investment seems to call for further regulation.3" However, any new
regulation must be evaluated within the broader context of investor
regulation as well as economic and political incentives acting on
sovereigns in their role as shareholders. This Article argues that the
current U.S. legal framework provides insulation against the
potentially negative effects of domestic sovereign investment. Still,
24. Id. at 7-8.
25. Id. at 27.
26. See State Administration of Foreign Exchange, People's Republic of China,
Monthly Foreign Exchange Reserves, 2008, http://www.safe.gov.cn/model-safeen/tjsjen/
tjsj-detail en.jsp?ID=30303000000000000,17&id=4 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
27. See Lyons, supra note 21, at 10.
28. Id. Senator Everett Dirksen is attributed (perhaps apocryphally) the line, "[a]
billion here, a billion there, pretty soon you're talking real money." The Dirksen Cong.
Ctr., "A Billion Here, A Billion There...," http://www.dirksencenter.org/printemd_
billionhere.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). If that is true, what should we call the trillions
flowing from SWFs?
29. Stabilization funds, by contrast, are designed primarily as a risk management
device and, thus, tend to invest in more conservative instruments such as Treasury notes.
ANDREW RoZANOV, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: DEFINING LIABILITIES 2 (2007),
available at http://www.ssga.com/library/esps/SoverignWealthFundsAndreRozanov_
4.27.07rev2CCRI1182371372.pdf.
30. See, e.g., Evan Bayh, Time for Sovereign Wealth Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb 13, 2008,
at A26, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120286960358864245.html?mod=rss
opinion_ main.
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SWFs remain tools of sovereigns that may act opportunistically.
While the United States has the ability to protect its interests when
SWFs purchase securities in U.S. firms,31 many other countries do
not, and U.S. interests may be harmed through SWF activity outside
its jurisdiction. Thus, this Article discusses the importance of
international efforts to mitigate the risk that SWFs could be used as
political tools.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, the Article defines
SWFs and discusses their benefits, and then turns to the various
problems they present to investees and host nations. Of particular
importance is the potential use of SWF investments as political tools.
SWFs also present unique regulatory questions for host nations.
Part II outlines the various regulations that govern SWF
investments in U.S. enterprises, arguing that the regulations mitigate
many of the potentially negative effects of SWF investment, including
possible political activities. Indeed, the risk that sovereigns will use
SWFs for harmful political activities is perhaps less likely than the
risk that the United States will dissuade SWF investment through
protectionist regulation or political application of regulations.
While this Article argues that existing regulatory, economic, and
political factors protect the United States against most of the
potential threats posed by SWF activities, SWF investment in other
markets may yet pose a danger to U.S. interests. For this reason, Part
III argues in support of the Santiago Principles,32 a voluntary code of
best practices that would provide assurance that SWFs will invest
apolitically in any market. In Part IV, the Article concludes by noting
some remaining concerns and suggesting lines of future research.
I. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: DEFINITIONS AND CONCERNS
A. Defining and Contextualizing Sovereign Investments
SWFs may be defined and categorized in various ways, but the
central and common feature of all SWFs is their origin as investment
vehicles established and controlled by a sovereign political entity.33
Categorization of SWFs may be based on purpose, investment intent,
31. See infra Part II.
32. INT'L WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES"
(Oct. 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf
[hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES].
33. INT'L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS-A WORK AGENDA 4
(2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf.
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or geographical region. SWFs are created for numerous purposes
including use as stabilization funds, endowment funds, pension
reserve funds, development funds, or government holdings
management funds.34 While all of these funds could be called
sovereign wealth funds, for purposes of this Article, the most
important of these funds are endowment funds, pension reserve
funds, and holdings management funds since these are the funds most
likely to invest in global equity markets.35
SWFs are also commonly categorized based on the source of
their funds. The first major category is made up of commodity funds
created through commodity exports owned or taxed by the
sovereign." Primarily, this category is composed of petrodollar funds
from oil exporting countries, including the funds of Norway, Russia,
Kuwait, Qatar, and the Alaska Permanent Fund.37 A second category
is composed of non-commodity funds that are established through
transfers of assets from official foreign exchange reserves38 including
Singapore39 and China.4" Singapore's GIC is the largest fund of this
type.4
1
In both categories, the funds are typically what might be called
recycling funds. Funds flow into emerging or commodities-based
economies and, for a variety of reasons including a relative scarcity of
investment opportunities, 42 the funds held by the sovereign may be
redeployed. Increasingly, these funds may be invested in developed
nations as equity investments in public companies. Recycling cash
flows back to the United States is viewed as a positive development;
rather than funneling investment returns to fund enterprises in other
countries, it allows some recapture of the capital.43 While equity
investments by SWFs raise serious political and economic concerns,
34. Id. at 5.
35. ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 3.
36. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Under Sec'y for Int'l Affairs David H.
McCormick Testimony Before the Joint Econ. Comm. (Feb. 13, 2008),
http://www.ustreas.gov/ press/releases/hp823.htm.
37. See Lyons, supra note 21, at 12.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 26-27.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 25 tbl.1.
42. See generally Keep Your T-bonds, We'll Take the Bank, supra note 20 (discussing
the financial roots of SWFs).
43. DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE NEW POWER
BROKERS: How OIL, ASIA, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY ARE SHAPING
GLOBAL MARKETS 31 (2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/TheNew_
PowerBrokers/ (follow "Launch this report" hyperlink).
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the converse problem of no investment from these very wealthy funds
may also pose serious long-term threats to sustained economic
prosperity. Part of the concern with funds being deployed elsewhere
is that there may be less transparency in these investments because
funds would not be subject to the type of reporting requirements that
monitor publicly traded entities in established markets.
The size and impact of SWFs is best understood through
comparison with other major investment vehicles such as traditional
institutional funds (including mutual funds), private equity funds, and
hedge funds. Considering total assets under management worldwide,
Chart 1 demonstrates that SWF assets are only a fraction of the funds
managed by institutional investors such as mutual funds and pensions
but outstrip private equity and hedge funds investments
considerably."
CHART 1
Worldwide Assets by Investor Type,
in Billions, as of December 200745
Pension Mutual Insurance Sovereign
funds funds assets wealth
funds
Hedge
funds
Private
equity
r m m
44. Id. at 11.
45. IFSL RESEARCH, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 2008 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.ifsl.org.uk/upload/CBS-SovereignWealthFunds 2008.pdf.
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As shown in Chart 1, institutional investors such as pension
funds and mutual funds are by far the largest players in established
international capital markets. 6 However, as noted by the U.S.
Treasury, SWFs as a whole are larger than both private equity funds
and hedge funds. According to the Treasury, SWFs are also "set to
grow at a much faster pace. '"" As noted above, there are only
approximately forty active SWFs,48 while there are hundreds of
institutional investors, private equity funds, and hedge funds. Across
the market as a whole, the potential footprint of the largest SWFs is
second only to the largest institutional funds and far surpasses the
largest hedge funds.49 The largest SWF, the ADIA fund of the
United Arab Emirates, is estimated to control $650 to $700 billion
which makes the fund roughly fifteen times larger than the Fidelity
Magellan Mutual Fund." If Saudi Arabia creates a fund, as it has
indicated it might, its SWF will likely "dwarf" ADIA 1
B. Benefits of Sovereign Investment
Sovereign wealth fund investment has provided and will continue
to provide both the sovereign investor and the host countries with a
number of beneficial externalities beyond the issuer benefits provided
through any specific investments. Significant SWF investment makes
the investor nation a partner in the economic health of the host
country.52 SWF investment may also lead to more open and better-
functioning markets within the investor nation. For example, CIC's
recent investments in U.S. enterprises may encourage Chinese
reciprocity and provide U.S. firms with increased access to China's
46. Id.
47. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of the Treasury, supra note 36.
48. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
49. Institutional investors of various types may have very different investment
strategies, and hedge funds and private equity funds may take larger stakes in companies
than many institutional investors would seek. See generally FARRELL ET AL., supra note
43, at 24-25. But in some cases SWFs tend to invest more like activist hedge funds (with
large, influential stakes) than more passive institutional investors. See infra notes 198-202
and accompanying text.
50. See Landon Thomas Jr., Cash-Rich, Publicity-Shy, Abu Dhabi Fund Draws
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at Cl.
51. Henny Sender, et al., Saudi Arabia Aims to Take Lead in Sovereign Wealth Fund
Stakes, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2007, at Al.
52. This old idea was expressed more eloquently by Montesquieu: "Two nations who
traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying,
the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union thus is founded on their mutual
necessities." 20 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, OF THE SPIRIT OF COMMERCE, reprinted in
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, at 316 (Thomas Nugent, trans. Hafner Press 1949) (1748).
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developing markets.53 Aligning enterprise interests with sovereign
interests through SWF investment could also help in areas such as
patent and copyright protection. A large investment by CIC in U.S.
media firms, for example, would perhaps incentivize China to protect
intellectual property rights more effectively.
SWFs are also generally considered to be stable investors by the
U.S. Department of Treasury. 4 Investment stability has been
especially prized in the volatile period associated with the subprime
crisis which saw numerous investments by SWFs in U.S. financial
firms."
C. Concerns with Sovereign Investment
Despite these benefits, however, much more attention has been
given to the risks of SWF investment. Concerns over SWFs are
focused on the ways in which their activities may differ from those of
other investors and on the limitations of host nations in regulating
such activities. 6
1. Political Risk
A primary concern with SWFs is that because the SWF is an
investment arm of a sovereign entity, the fund's investments may be
used for political purposes. U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission
Chairman Christopher Cox, in a representative comment, said that
"[i]nvestors and regulators alike have to ask themselves whether
government-controlled companies and investment funds will always
direct their affairs in furtherance of investment returns, or rather will
53. On the other hand, we might also worry that the power to grant market access to
an enterprise might encourage rent-seeking by the sovereign, where access is conditioned
on preferential treatment over other shareholders.
54. As noted by Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmitt,
SWFs are in principle long-term investors which typically do not deviate from
their strategic asset allocations in the face of short-term volatility. They are not
highly leveraged, and it is difficult to see how they could be forced by regulatory
capital requirements or sudden investor withdrawals to liquidate their positions
quickly. In this context, SWFs may be considered a force for financial stability-
supplying liquidity to the markets, raising asset prices, and lowering buying yields
in the countries in which they invest.
Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the
World Economy, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 119,122 (2008).
55. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
56. See ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 1-4.
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use business resources in the pursuit of other government interests."57
Among these government interests might be the acquisition of
sensitive technologies or expertise through the purchase of a
controlling stake in a company, or the acquisition of a major supplier
of a limited natural resource. Economist Lawrence Summers asks:
What about the day when a country joins some "coalition of the
willing" and asks the U.S. president to support a tax break for a
company in which it has invested? Or when a decision has to
be made about whether to bail out a company, much of whose
debt is held by an ally's central bank?58
There are also more subtle and less directly regulated ways in
which a SWF may exercise political power. For example, a sovereign
might direct a SWF to invest in a company in order to encourage the
company (either as a condition to investment or perhaps as a
shareholder) to build a manufacturing facility in the country in order
to provide jobs, diversify the economy, and strengthen the country's
tax base.59 Perhaps more benignly, a sovereign might also direct
SWFs to invest in companies that have created negative externalities
or have manufactured products the sovereign finds socially
undesirable, seeking to encourage corporate activities that lessen or
eliminate such externalities, or lead to changes in products or modes
of production. For example, a SWF could invest in an auto
manufacturer in order to influence the automaker to produce vehicles
using alternative automotive fuel sources, or it could invest in a
pharmaceutical company in order to encourage development of
certain therapies. Or, a SWF may invest in companies that provide
services to the sovereign as a way of recapturing or reducing some of
the costs of such services. A sovereign with significant U.S.
investments may also use its investment as a bargaining chip with the
federal government. Consider the Treasury or Federal Reserve
Board faced with a threat by a sovereign to withdraw its billions from
U.S. companies unless the Treasury or Federal Reserve Board adopts
57. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Keynote Address and Robert
R. Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University:
The Role of Government in Markets (Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2007/spch102407cc.htm.
58. Lawrence Summers, Funds that Shake Capitalist Logic, FIN. TIMES, July 29, 2007,
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/bb8fSOb8-3dcc-lldc-8f6a-0000779fd2ac.html.
59. Assuming that such a transaction does not implicate a breach of fiduciary duties
or violate antitrust laws, there is no reason why such a transaction could not benefit the
company, the SWF, and the sovereign and its citizens. The concern, however, is that the
sovereign will use the SWF to the detriment of the company.
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a certain policy.6 In all these respects, SWFs differ from most other
investors because they have the potential to be employed as political
or economic tools rather than as investment instruments.
A more nebulous concern is the rise of state capitalism. Capital
markets in the United States are dominated by private funds
operating primarily under federal government supervision but with
limited governmental intervention. Some observers have questioned
whether the existing regulatory structure can manage the activity of
sovereigns in markets designed for transactions involving
predominantly private actors.6' More generally, the increased
involvement of political actors in U.S. capital markets also represents
a possible shift from market capitalism to a state capitalism in which
commercial motives are mixed with or displaced by political motives.
Chairman Cox asks: "If the distinction between government and
private activity in our capital markets is increasingly blurred, is there
a point at which the entire financial activity we today call a free
market stops being precisely that, and morphs into something else?"62
Similarly, management scholar Jeffrey Garten argues that the rise of
state capitalism demonstrates "government efforts to reassert control
over their economies and to use this to enhance their global influence
.... We can expect less productivity, less innovation and less growth,
since governments have many goals that the private sector does
not."63
Because of the size of China's economic and geopolitical
footprint, it is of particular concern to policymakers whether China
will be a political investor.' China, unlike those countries whose
economies are based on petrodollars, may be less dependent on the
financial success of SWF investment activities.65 Many petrodollar
funds may be attempting to diversify in order to be able to maintain
social programs after their petroleum resources no longer provide
60. While such a scenario may seem likely, note that a SWF, as an entity without
fiduciaries and without competitors for funds, may not be as sensitive to the losses it
would inevitably take by withdrawing funds in a short time through market transactions.
61. See ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 1.
62. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Gauer Distinguished Lecture
in Law and Policy at the American Enterprise Institute Legal Center for the Public
Interest: The Rise of Sovereign Business (Dec. 5, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
2007/spchl20507cc.htm.
63. Jeffrey Garten, The Unsettling Zeitgeist of State Capitalism, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2008, http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=fto011420081502150015.
64. A Special Report on Globalisation: The Rise of State Capitalism, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 20, 2008, at 24.
65. Id. at 25.
2008]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
significant income.66 China, on the other hand, has a rapidly growing
economy that is not dependent on a single resource or industry.
China may use funds less conservatively, which creates a heightened
concern that they may use their funds for political purposes.
2. Economic and Regulatory Risks
SWFs are increasingly important actors in markets that were not
expressly designed to regulate their participation. Although
regulators hope that SWFs invest and behave like other investors, the
SEC chair and some staff have expressed concern that the SEC may
not be able to regulate SWFs as it does other investors. 67 In a speech
on the impact of SWFs, SEC Chairman Cox stated:
Neither international law nor the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act renders these funds immune from the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts in connection with their commercial
activity conducted in the United States. But a discussion
between the SEC and a foreign government might be quite
different if, instead of seeking cooperation in an enforcement
matter in which we were mutually interested, the SEC were
pressing claims of insider trading against that very government
.... When a foreign private issuer is suspected of violating
U.S. securities laws, our experience working with our overseas
regulatory counterparts indicates that we could almost always
expect the full support of the foreign government in
investigating the matter. But if the same government from
whom we sought assistance were also the controlling person
behind the entity under investigation, a considerable conflict of
interest would arise.68
Compounding this regulatory challenge is the fact that SWFs are,
as a group, less transparent relative to more regulated institutional
investors such as pension funds and mutual funds.69 Only a few SWFs
publish information on their size, returns, composition of their
portfolios, investment objectives, and proxy voting policies.7" For
66. ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 4-5.
67. Cox, supra note 57.
68. Id.
69. Linda Chatman Thomsen, Dir. Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Testimony Concerning Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Disclosure Before the U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/2008/tsO20708lct.htm.
70. Paper Presented by Edwin M. Truman at the Conference on China's Exchange
Rate Policy, A Scoreboard for Sovereign Wealth Funds 14-15 (Oct. 19, 2007), available at
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many SWFs, transparency with respect to investment objectives is
limited to issuing statements to the press that the fund's objective is a
high return on investment,71 or, in other words, that the SWF does not
have any political motive for its investments. However, even where
an investment position is clearly disclosed, the SWF may later decide
to alter its objectives concerning a particular investment in pursuit of
a political goal. If it does this, what should or could be the response
of the portfolio company's country of domicile? Additionally, some
commentators worry that SWFs may create unique systemic risks.72
While SWFs may provide needed capital for U.S. markets, as
evidenced by the nearly thirty seven billion dollars invested in U.S.
financial firms between June 2007 and February 2008,73 they often
take large stock positions (in terms of investment value, although
typically not in terms of voting power). These large inflows of capital
may inflate asset prices. 74  Further, a SWF could cause significant
turmoil if, for reasons of national exigency, the SWF must liquidate
its positions.
Another concern with SWF size and influence is the potential for
abuse of informational disparities. Sovereign wealth funds have
particular informational advantages that may not be available to
other investors, or, in some cases, even to company insiders. For
example, a SWF may learn of a pending action against a corporation
through government channels. Or, the sovereign could be in the
position to bring an action against the competitors of one of its
investments. SEC Chairman Cox raised the specter of government
power as being "no longer used solely to police the securities markets
at arm's length, but rather ... to ensure the success of the
government's commercial or investment activities ... ,71 He suggests
the possibility of a world in which governments use "the vast amounts
of covert information collection that are available through their
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/trumanl007swf.pdf (showing the study's
transparency and accountability scores for various SWFs).
71. See, e.g., Steven Weisman, China Tries to Reassure U.S. About its Investing Plans,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2008, at C2.
72. See, e.g., BRAD W. SETSER, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, SOVEREIGN
WEALTH AND SOVEREIGN POWER: THE STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN
INDEBTEDNESS, COUNCIL SPECIAL REPORT NO. 37, at 27-35 (September 2008), available
at http://www.cfr.org/ content/publications/attachments/Debt andPower CSR37.pdf
(noting the risks of relying on external financing for the United States); see also FARRELL
ET AL., supra note 43, at 15-16 (discussing the systemic risks posed by SWFs and hedge
funds).
73. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
74. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 16.
75. Cox, supra note 57.
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national intelligence services ' ' 76 in trading and other market activities,
to the disadvantage of private investors.
Using an argument that has been raised in defense of insider
trading rules generally, Cox argues asserts that "[i]f ordinary
investors-an estimated 100 million retail customers who own more
than $10 trillion in equities and stock funds in U.S. markets-come to
believe that they are at an informational disadvantage, confidence in
our capital markets could collapse, and along with it, the market
itself.' '77  So long as sovereigns are using their funds for wealth
creation rather than other purposes, such activities would seem to be
against their own interests if they are diversified investors. Again,
however, to the extent that sovereigns do engage in manipulative
activities, the SEC may be in the politically difficult position of
bringing an action against the SWF and its managers.
Courts may also have difficulty accommodating SWFs. Because
of their diversified investments and relatively large financial stakes in
individual companies, SWFs will inevitably invest in companies that
will face lawsuits as a result of securities fraud. Under the application
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"),78 the
presumptive lead plaintiff will be the shareholder with the greatest
loss;79 however, a judge might want to exclude the SWF because the
SWF would arguably not meet the "typicality" requirement of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 23(a)(3).8 ° Should SWFs
be considered typical investors under FRCP 23(a)(3)? Competing
potential plaintiffs may challenge the adequacy of the SWF as lead
plaintiff and ask for discovery into the business of the SWF,81 which
will likely be uncomfortable for many opaque SWFs that might
otherwise prefer to serve as lead plaintiff.
The risks associated with SWF investment are economic,
political, and procedural in nature. While SWF investment has
perhaps been a boon to the United States because the funds have
provided needed capital to distressed U.S. financial firms, questions
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 78u-4 (2006).
79. See id. § 101(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)), § 101(b) (amending 15
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)).
80. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the claims or defenses of the class
representative must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(3).
81. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1603
(2006).
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remain as to whether state investment fundamentally alters private
markets. If it does, what are the political consequences of such a
change? And, will the United States be able to adequately regulate
sovereign investment without such regulation triggering political
consequences?
II. REGULATION OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
Against this substantial list of risks and questions surrounding
SWF investments, this Part attempts to address whether U.S.
regulatory structures are sufficiently robust to manage such risks.
Despite the magnitude of these concerns, an existing framework of
federal and state laws, along with crucial political and economic
factors, eliminates or mitigates many of the risks.
A. Political and Economic Factors
To date, SWFs have generally avoided political activities. In
part, this is due to regulatory restraints imposed by host countries. In
the United States, investments that might affect national security-
such as the acquisition of controlling stakes in firms producing
sensitive technologies, vital commodities, or resources-are regulated
through the vetting process of the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States ("CFIUS"). A number of other developed
economies, including EU economies, have enacted or are considering
similar legislation. 2 The significant attention created by SWF
investment activities has thus far forced SWFs to invest modestly,
and, in some cases, to accept conditions to investment that ensure the
SWFs remain passive investors. For example, as a condition to its
$7.5 billion investment in Citi, Abu Dhabi's SWF agreed "not to own
more than a 4.9% stake in Citi, and will have no special rights of
ownership or control and no role in the management or governance
of Citi, including no right to designate a member of the Citi Board of
Directors."83  Indeed, it has been suggested that following a few
unofficial rules of investment, largely focused on eliminating the
potential for political mischief by either the SWF or the host country,
will help SWFs avoid suspicion. For example, a reporter observed
that to avoid scrutiny from host country regulators, SWFs should:
82. Carter Dougherty & Stephen Castle, EU Warns Against Overreaction on
Sovereign Wealth Funds, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 25, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/
2008/02/25/business/fund.php.
83. Press Release, Citigroup, Inc., Citi to Sell $7.5 Billion of Equity Units to the Abu
Dhabi Investment Authority (Nov. 26, 2007), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/press/2007/
071126j.htm.
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* Buy small stakes, not entire firms.
* Emphasize that board membership, or other control, is
not in the game plan.
* Consult in advance with federal agencies and elected
officials likely to be sensitive.
Avoid certain sectors, such as energy or government
contracting-though if the stake is small enough, it may
not be an issue.84
The voluntary adoption of such policies in recent transactions has
helped SWFs avoid some of the missteps of the Dubai Ports World
("DP World") and China National Offshore Oil Company Ltd.
("CNOOC") transactions (discussed in Part III.C of this Article), that
resulted in heightened scrutiny of foreign investment.
There are a number of economic factors that also limit the
likelihood that a SWF will be used as a political tool. First, there is
some evidence that prior attempts at state capitalism through mixed-
motive investment-political motivations combined with commercial
intentions-have resulted in relatively poor performance." Assessing
the economic impact of political investments is not always straight-
forward; for example, it may not be possible to evaluate the return on
a strategic investment to acquire military technology that may not
produce a viable weapon for years and may never be used in an actual
conflict. Nor is it easy to quantify an investment that is ultimately
designed to bolster national pride. However, a conventional
assessment of publicly- versus privately-managed funds shows that
private funds fare significantly better than government-managed
funds, and that more politically motivated, government-managed
funds tend to fare more poorly. 6 Studies of government-managed
investment in the 1980s indicate that governments are not more
successful at allocating capital than private enterprise, especially
when the investment decisions are based at least in part on political
objectives.87
84. Christopher S. Rugaber, Offshore Investors Take Low Profile to Avoid Political
Resistance to Deals, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 2, 2007, http://www.thestar.com/Business/
article/281708.
85. Id.
86. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 841 (1993). But see Annika Sund6n & Alicia H.
Munnell, Investment Practices of State and Local Pension Plans, in PENSIONS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 153, 161 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Edwin C. Hustead eds., 1999) (questioning
the adequacy of Romano's sample).
87. See Romano, supra note 86, at 805.
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Another economic factor that limits political activities is that
SWFs are, or will likely become, widely diversified investors with a
limited economic interest in each investment (at least with respect to
U.S. investments). SWFs are diversified as a result of their large size
and their deliberate efforts to limit suspicion. However, a decision to
engage in political activities with respect to just one such investment
would create a cascade of protectionist responses to many if not all of
the SWF's existing or planned investments. For example, a
politically-motivated action by a SWF with respect to one of its U.S.
investments would draw scrutiny on the SWs other investments in
the U.S. and other host countries, including investigations of
completed transactions and more stringent reviews of planned
transactions. Most SWFs engage in transactions designed to fall
outside CFIUS jurisdiction by limiting their investments to a non-
controlling stake.88 Even SWF investments that do not fall under
CFIUS jurisdiction initially, however, may trigger jurisdiction if the
SWF directs or perhaps even influences the company to act in a
political manner. During the review of the SWF's activities, CFIUS
may exercise its broad remedial powers to freeze or unwind a SWF's
investment and would likely investigate the SWF's other U.S.
investments to determine whether it has attempted similar political
activities with other companies. Viewed from this perspective, the
size and diversification of SWFs suggest that it would be economically
unwise for SWFs to engage in political activities; SWFs should
rationally seek to avoid the uncertainty and potentially heavy
regulatory burdens that would result from a deviation from a default
investment posture.
Finally, and most significantly, if SWFs did engage in political
activities, perhaps against economic interests, the SWFs also risk both
political and economic responses.89 While some countries may not
88. Transactions that are reviewed and approved by CFIUS are typically more secure
for SWFs because CFIUS is limited by statute in its review of post-approval activities.
Generally, investigations of SWF investments can be reopened only if a mitigation
agreement is breached. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
89. For evidence of a connection between political activities and the financial
markets, one may look at the recent experience of Russia. In part due to a shareholder
dispute between British Petroleum and its Russian partners (with heavy-handed
intervention by the Russian government) and Russia's August 2008 military action in
Georgia, the Russian stock market declined 54% between July 1st and September 17th.
Jason Bush, Behind the Russian Stock Market Meltdown, BUS. WK., Sept 16, 2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/ sep2008/gb20080917 169033.htm; Jason
Bush, A New Start for TNK-BP, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/
globalbiz/content/sep2008/gb2008094-600699.htm.
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possess the economic or political power to defend their interests
against more powerful nations, the United States is not in such a
position. Even in the best case, political uses of SWFs would likely
trigger extensive political and economic negotiations and a
deterioration of the relationship between the United States and the
sovereign. A more likely result in the United States, given political
suspicion of SWF activity, is a harsh protectionist response that would
create economic strain for both the United States and SWF sponsor
countries. While SWFs have yet to act or been made to act politically
in the United States, they operate under unique scrutiny. The
suspicion surrounding SWFs will likely cause SWFs to act hyper-
cautiously. For example, unlike other investors not operating under
political suspicion, SWFs may fear that suggesting cost-cutting
measures could be viewed as a politically motivated effort to
encourage outsourcing (perhaps to the SWF's home country).
Because of fears that the SWF will be used as a political tool of the
state, the SWF must consider the potential political effect of any
action or statement it or the sovereign makes regarding its
investments.
B. State Corporate Laws
While SWF investments are a relatively novel problem for
politicians and regulators, state laws have long dealt with the basic
concern presented by SWFs: the potential divergence of interests
among shareholders. This problem is regulated or mitigated through
a variety of protections. First, corporate law, despite some minor
variations from state to state, still provides relatively meager power to
shareholders.9" Shareholders are entitled to elect, though generally
not select, nominees for the board of directors. Shareholders are also
entitled to vote on certain major corporate transactions and events,
and they have a limited ability to put forward proposals to be
included on the company's annual proxy statement.91 The exercise of
voting rights by SWFs in such instances should give no cause for
alarm, since SWF investment will almost always result in minority
ownership of the corporation and correspondingly limited voting
90. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L.
REV. 675, 676 (2007) (arguing that shareholders do not, in reality, have the directorial
power implied in the idea of "corporate democracy" and the shareholder franchise); see
also id. at 679-94 (discussing the limitations on the shareholder power to replace
directors).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
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power and will generally not include the right to representative
directors.
Second, the duty of loyalty owed to the company and the
shareholders by managers and directors provides some protection
against the use of SWFs as a political tool.9 2 Absent self-dealing on
the part of management or directors, it is difficult to imagine a
company pursuing a transaction that would privilege SWFs or their
sovereign sponsors at the expense of other shareholders. On the
other hand, if the SWF were a controlling shareholder, or if
management or directors were receiving some benefit from a
transaction that favored the SWF or sponsoring sovereign at the
expense of other shareholders,93 the transaction generally would be
voidable under state law unless approved by a majority of
disinterested directors or disinterested shareholders, or was found to
be fair to the corporation and other shareholders.94
Finally, even in the unlikely event that a SWF were permitted to
place representative directors on the board, state corporate law holds
that the duties of directors run to the corporation and the
stockholders as a whole and not to the entity that by contract or
voting power placed the director on the board.95 Directors owe a
92. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993)
("Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interests.") (quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939)).
93. Besides a state law claim, such a transaction risks Internal Revenue Service
scrutiny. A transaction favoring certain stockholders over others may be deemed a
constructive dividend, and the corporation would lose the ability to claim it as an expense.
See JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 38 (2006).
94. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2008) ("No contract or transaction
between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation
and any other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or
more of its directors or officers, are directors or officers, or have a financial interest, shall
be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the
contract or transaction, or solely because any such director's or officer's votes are counted
for such purpose, if: ... (3) The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of
the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or
the shareholders"); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.61 (2008) ("A director's conflict of
interest transaction may not be the subject of equitable relief, or give rise to an award of
damages or other sanctions against a director of a corporation, in a proceeding by a
shareholder or by or in the right of the corporation, if ... (3) the transaction, judged
according to the circumstances at the relevant time, is established to have been fair to the
corporation.").
95. For a discussion of this principle, see R. FRANKLIN BALOITI & JESSE
FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§ 4.3 (3d ed. 1998). Note, however, that while directors representing minority
shareholders face penalties for a breach of fiduciary duties, there is no respondeat superior
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
duty of care, which typically requires them to manage the affairs of
the company in accordance with a standard of reasonable care,96 and
a duty of loyalty, which requires them to manage the interest of the
company in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation and
its stockholders.97 These fiduciary duties place a liability constraint
around SWF-appointed director decision-making. Any decision that
would place the interests of the SWF or the sovereign at odds with
the rest of the shareholders would require disclosure of the adverse
interest of the SWF or sovereign, recusal of the SWF-appointee from
the deciding vote, and approval of the decision by a majority of
disinterested directors, all of whom have fiduciary duties to the
corporation and its shareholders.98
A more problematic aspect of SWF-appointed directors is that
the appointee-directors could pass confidential corporate information
to their clients either for use in trading or for political purposes. In
both cases, however, existing state statutes and case law police such
behavior, and ex ante protections could also reduce the risk of
violations and misuse of corporate information. Confidential
information could not be passed to a sovereign without violating the
duty of loyalty; reasonable boards would be careful to limit the
possibility of disclosure by asking that the appointee recuse himself or
herself from the discussions. And, while federal insider trading laws
impose penalties for trading on material, non-public information, the
company could also adopt additional protections. For instance, to
mitigate the risk of insider trading and potential difficulties in
prosecuting a SWF or a sovereign, the company could adopt an
insider trading policy that would prohibit trades by the appointee,
SWF, or other entity of the sovereign during "blackout" periods.
liability for the SWF or the sovereign as there would be for directors of a controlling
shareholder.
Note also that if a SWF were able to place a director on the board, CFIUS would
likely have jurisdiction and the SWF would likely be required to sign a mitigation
agreement (as discussed in Part III.C.3, infra) that would provide another level of
protection against political or mixed-motive decision making by the SWF and the board.
96. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (2007).
97. Amendments to Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirements, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-39538, 63 Fed. Reg. 15,286 (Mar. 31, 1998) (correcting 63 Fed. Reg. 2,854
(Jan. 16, 1998)), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/finaU/34-39538.txt [hereinafter
Reporting Amendments].
98. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
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C. Federal Regulation
The regulatory responses to SWF investment by host countries
typically have at least one major common feature: the restriction of
SWFs to investment activity rather than political activity. U.S.
regulations are typical in this respect. However, concern over
political activities must be balanced against protectionism that could
ultimately harm U.S. markets and companies. To balance these
concerns, two general principles should govern domestic regulation of
SWFs. First, SWFs should be allowed fair, non-discriminatory access
to U.S. markets. Second, U.S. regulators and markets must have the
ability to quickly check political behavior by SWFs. The United
States must have an open-door policy with respect to its markets but
ensure fair and effective regulation for all participants. As discussed
in the following Subsections, existing regulations, with some limited
exceptions, meet the criteria of openness, fairness, and efficiency, and
they provide the ability to address problematic behavior by SWFs.
1. Securities Regulation
Outside of CFIUS (discussed in Part III.C.3 of this Article), the
most important federal regulations for SWFs are the SEC's disclosure
rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").99
The SEC's Exchange Act Rule 13(d) sets out a tripartite disclosure
system for disclosure by shareholders: for a shareholder holding less
than five percent of the company's outstanding stock, no disclosures
are required by the shareholder. For passive investors, defined under
Rule 13(d) as persons not seeking to acquire or influence control of
the issuer and who own less than twenty percent of an issuer's
outstanding securities,1" SEC rules mandate a short-form disclosure
of identifying information under Schedule 13G and require
certification that the securities were not "acquired... for the purpose
nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer,
nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having
such purpose or effect... ,"'01 To avoid even this minimal disclosure
burden, most SWF investments have been in amounts below the five
percent level.102
99. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2006)).
100. See Reporting Amendments, supra note 97.
101. See Exchange Act Rule 13d-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b) (2008).
102. As with Al-waleed bin Talal, the Saudi prince who holds nearly five percent of
Citigroup, an investor holding less than five percent may have a significant impact on the
governance of a company; however, this is the exception rather than the rule. Prince Al-
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For investors owning more than five percent of the company and
not eligible for Schedule 13G, Schedule 13D requires more detailed
disclosures by the investor including, among other things, a discussion
of "the purpose or purposes of the acquisition of securities., 10 3 The
SEC requirements thus encourage investment under levels that would
trigger disclosure requirements. A reasonable reading of the statute
would require some of the transparency that SWFs have been asked
to provide. Namely, SWFs with significant investments that have
designs on control would be required to disclose any purposes for the
investment, including political purposes, which, as discussed below,
should trigger review by CFIUS.' ° It is possible, of course, that a
SWF would not disclose political intentions but then use its
investment for political purposes nevertheless. Such activity could
bring SEC enforcement action but more importantly would bring
heightened political and regulatory scrutiny of all the SWF
investments in the United States and probably in every other
jurisdiction in which the SWF has invested. Again, for diversified
SWFs, the costs of political activity would seem to far outweigh any
potential benefits.1"5
The federal securities law concept of control person liability also
discourages controlling investments. Under section 15 of the
Securities Act" 6 and section 20 of the Exchange Act,0 7 control
persons may be held liable for misstatements or omissions in a
controlled issuer's registration statements, prospectuses, and periodic
filings." 8 The statutes do not define "control," although the SEC has
provided some guidance in its rules, stating that control is the
"possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the
direction of the management and policies of a person, whether
through the ownership of voting securities, by contract, or
otherwise."'0 9  By attaching potential liability to management
waleed's influence may be justified by his consistent investment focus over the course of a
long investment relationship with Citigroup. Andy Serwer & Barney Gimbel, Prince
Alwaleed: Why Chuck Had to Go, FORTUNE, Nov. 16 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/
11/08/news! companies/citigroup-alwaleed.fort une/index.htm.
103. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, pt. 4 (2000).
104. See infra Part III.C.3.
105. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2006).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
108. At least with respect to liability under 20(a) of the Exchange Act, control persons
who act in "good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting
the violation or cause of action" may escape liability. Id.
109. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 (2000).
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authority, the securities laws create incentives for passive minority
investment.
Finally, section 16 of the Exchange Act places both reporting
requirements and trading restrictions (the "short-swing profit" rules)
on holders of more than ten percent of a public reporting company's
stock. A SWF that owns more than ten percent in a company's
securities will suffer a decrease in liquidity because of the limitations
the short-swing profit rules place on the SWF's trades in the
company's securities,11° with a concomitant increase in the SWF's risk
in the investment. Thus, the insider trading rules under section 16 of
the Exchange Act also serve to limit SWF investment in U.S. firms. 1
2. Other Federal Regulations
A variety of industry-specific federal regulations also discourage
the acquisition of a controlling stake in U.S. firms." 2 Given that the
most significant investments in U.S. firms by SWFs have been in the
financial services industry, the most important of these thus far has
been the regulations under the Change in Bank Control Act and the
Bank Holding Company Act. Under the Bank Holding Company
Act, for example, investors must obtain Federal Reserve Board
approval if their investment results in the acquisition or control of
twenty-five percent or more of any class of voting securities of a bank
110. Section 16(b) states that any profits realized by beneficial owner of more than ten
percent of any class of equity securities of a publicly traded corporation from the purchase
and sale (or sale and purchase) of any equity security of such corporation occurring within
a six-month period must be disgorged to the company. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a)-(b) (2006).
111. The insider trading rules discourage holding large blocks of shares by any type of
investor. For a discussion of the effect of insider trading rules on institutional investor
holdings, see Steven Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV, 601, 618-19 (2006).
112. Another possible line of federal oversight of SWFs is through tax policy.
Currently, sovereign wealth funds and foreign central banks received favorable tax
treatment for their equity investments under sections 892 and 895 of the Internal Revenue
Code. 26 U.S.C. §§ 892, 895 (2000). Professor Vic Fleischer argues for tax-neutral
treatment of sovereign wealth funds and, among other alternatives, suggests an
excise tax on equity investments by sovereign wealth funds, but the tax would be
waived if the investors met specified goals of transparency, accountability, and low
political risk. To ease issues of institutional competence, this approach would
require tax administrators to coordinate with other executive branch officials to
generate a list of 'most-favored nations' that would qualify for the tax exemption.
In other words, we would tax sovereign wealth funds favorably, as private financial
investors, if they provide evidence that they will act like private financial investors.
Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 60, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1234410).
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or bank holding company, control of the election of a majority of the
board of directors of a bank or bank holding company, or the ability
to exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of
the bank or bank holding company.113 Furthermore, triggering any of
these tests results in regulation of the investor as a "bank holding
company," which, among other things, subjects the investor to
supervision by the Federal Reserve and imposes examination,
reporting, and capital reserve requirements." 4
3. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
The most direct federal protection against political use of SWF
investments is the review process managed by a committee that
includes the Secretaries of the Treasury, Homeland Security,
Commerce, Defense, State, Energy, Labor,'15 the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Attorney General (collectively, the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or
"CFIUS"). The CFIUS review process in its current form was set out
in The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
("FINSA")." 6  FINSA amended the Exon-Florio process which
covers national security review of foreign investments in U.S. entities.
The FINSA amendments are the result of the controversy arising
from CNOOC's bid for Unocal and the Dubai Ports World deal. A
number of "highly intrusive and restrictive"'' 7 bills were introduced,
but, after negotiations, Congress, the Bush administration, and the
business community settled on the " 'least bad' option in an
environment where some form of legislative overhaul seemed
inevitable."'".8
The CFIUS process governs "any merger, acquisition or
takeover that is proposed ... by or with any foreign person which
could result in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States," and it focuses on investments that
may have a security impact on "critical infrastructure."'1 9 Under
recent regulations from the Treasury Department, control is
113. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (2006).
114. Id.
115. The Secretary of Labor is a nonvoting, ex-officio member. 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 2170(k)(2)(H) (West Supp. 2008).
116. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 246 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (West Supp. 2008)).
117. Christopher F. Corr, US Tightens the Screws on Foreign Investors, WHITE &
CASE, July 26, 2007, http://www.whitecase.com/alert-internationaltrade_0707/.
118. Id.
119. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000).
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the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through
the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total
outstanding voting interest in an entity, board representation,
proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal
or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to
determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an
entity; in particular, but without limitation, to determine, direct,
take, reach, or cause decisions regarding the following matters,
or any other similarly important matters affecting an entity.120
The regulations then go on to list decisions that demonstrate
control, such as the sale or encumbrance of assets, reorganizations or
merger of the entity, closing or relocating facilities, major
expenditures, issuances of equity or debt, selection of business
ventures, entering into or terminating significant contracts, altering
policies for control of sensitive information, appointment or dismissal
of senior officers, appointing or dismissing persons with access to
sensitive information, and amending organizational documents.121
Under the CFIUS process, parties to a covered transaction
typically file a voluntary notice, often even when it appears that the
transaction does not involve a controlling ownership.122 After notice
is received, CFIUS undertakes a thirty day "National Security
Review. ' 123  Following this review, CFIUS may either allow the
transaction to proceed, or may undertake a second, forty-five day
"National Security Investigation. '124 Certain transactions, however,
automatically require the second-stage review, including foreign
government-controlled transactions, which are defined as transactions
in which "an entity controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign
government seeks to engage in any merger, acquisition, or takeover
which could result in the control of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States that could effect the national security
of the United States.' 1 25 An exception to this requirement is a finding
by senior CFIUS officials that, after review, the transaction will not
120. Department of the Treasury, RIN 1505-AB88, Regulations Pertaining to Mergers,
Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons (Nov. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/finalregs-111408-%2O.pdf.
121. Id.
122. John B. Reynolds, III et al., CFIUS Reform Legislation Signed Into Law, WILEY
REIN LLP, Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://www.wileyrein.com/publication.cfm?
publicationid= 13209.
123. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1) (2000).
124. § 2170(b)(2).
125. § 2170(a).
2008]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
impair the national security of the United States.126 CFIUS officials
have also developed a practice (though not a rule) of not formally
investigating deals involving the acquisition of less than ten percent 127
of the company's outstanding stock, provided the acquisition does not
bring with it the incidents of control for the investor, such as a seat on
the board of directors.
CFIUS, especially after the FINSA amendments, often
conditions its approval of SWF investments on the signing of
''mitigation agreements" that interested government agencies broker
between purchasers and sellers. 128  Mitigation agreements may
require special security agreements, audits, adherence to various
federal guidelines and "best practices," and liquidated damages. 29 In
the case of a SWF, a mitigation agreement involving a minority SWF
shareholder could reasonably stipulate that the SWF remain a passive
shareholder, prohibiting the SWF shareholder from seeking a seat on
the board of directors. In practice, however, SWF investors by design
tend to invest in amounts that do not compel investigation by
CFIUS.13° Further, passive investment terms are set by the issuer and
the SWF so that the risk of political involvement-not only by the
SWF but by U.S. government agencies or members of Congress-is
minimized.
The FINSA amendments of 2007 attempt to chart a moderate
course with respect to sovereign investment concerns. Some
commentators and politicians have expressed concerns that the
CFIUS process does not provide sufficient protection. For example,
126. See § 2170(d).
127. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302(d)(1) (2007). The ten percent threshold is not a bright line
but merely a rule of thumb; CFIUS looks at functional control. See id. § 800 app. A.
Incidents of control could come at lower levels of ownership than ten percent, especially
where there is a limited public float of common stock.
128. Regulating Sovereign Investments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Jeanne S. Archibald, Dir.,
Int'l Trade Practice, Hogan & Hartson LLP).
129. Impact of Foreign Ownership on Data Controls and Infrastructure: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. of Transp., Sec. and Infrastructure Prot. of the H. Comm. on
Homeland Sec., 110th Cong. (2007) (statements of Stewart A. Baker, Assistant Sec'y for
Pol'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec.; Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Sec'y for Infrastructure
Protection, Dep't of Homeland Sec.; and Gregory Garcia, Assistant Sec'y for Cyber Sec.
and Telecomm., Dep't of Homeland Sec.), video recording of hearing available at
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/ 20070323155353-12290.pdf.
130. Note, however, that in emerging and domestic economies, SWFs often take
controlling stakes. See William Miracky et al., Assessing the Risks: The Behaviors of
Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Global Economy, MONITOR GROUP, June 2008, at 4,
available at http://www.monitor.com/Portals/O/MonitorContentldocuments/MonitorSWF
_report-final.pdf.
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Senator Evan Bayh argues that shareholders such as Prince Al-
waleed bin Talal may exercise influence over a company even while
owning less than five percent of the outstanding stock of the
company.131 Such transactions might not come within the scope of
CFIUS review, because they do not involve a controlling stake.
However, CFIUS still retains the ability to initiate a review even
though it did not earlier conduct a formal thirty day review or forty-
five day investigation. For example, when a SWF that did not initially
acquire control later attempts to acquire and exercise control, CFIUS
may begin an investigation and suspend or void any politically
motivated transactions.
A SWF may use its investment in a political manner yet still fall
outside of the control test that defines CFIUS jurisdiction. However,
because CFIUS defines control broadly as the ability to "determine,
direct, take, reach, or cause decisions regarding.., important matters
affecting an entity," there seems to be little that a SWF could do that
would fall outside of legitimate investment activity and yet fail to
trigger CFIUS review.132 The mere exercise of voting rights could not
enable the SWF to direct the company to reveal sensitive
technologies or to invest in the sponsoring sovereign, for example.
The SWF would require control to force such transactions, and the
act of attempting to acquire control would trigger CFIUS review.
Outside of CFIUS' jurisdiction, within the murkier sphere of
shareholder influence, protection against political activity decreases.
Still, even though CFIUS would no longer apply, other factors would
work against political activity so that SWFs should not possess
influence greater than other shareholders. Suppose again that a
sovereign wishes to pressure a company in its SWF's portfolio to
build a factory in one of the sovereign's poorer regions. If the
transaction is fair to the company and its shareholders, perhaps the
company will agree. But why would a minority ownership by a SWF
suggest that the company and sovereign would not negotiate at arms'
length? Put another way, what pressure could the sovereign apply
that would not create serious political and economic consequences for
the sovereign and its SWE? It could not, for example, threaten to
foreclose opportunities to the company to do business in the country
without having such a decision characterized as politically motivated.
131. See Bayh, supra note 30.
132. Department of the Treasury, RIN 1505-AB88, Regulations Pertaining to Mergers,
Acquisitions and Takeovers by Foreign Persons (Nov. 18, 2008), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/cfius/docs/finairegs-111408-%20.pdf.
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Likewise, it could not threaten to sell its shares without a similar
result.'33 Even where CFIUS does not reach, other laws, economic
realties, and political consequences provide considerable assurance
against political use of SWFs.
A number of concerns remain with the CFIUS process, however,
which suggest that the risk of heavy-handed application of CFIUS is
greater than the risk of political exploitation of SWFs by sponsoring
sovereigns. First, even for transactions that are not reviewed, CFIUS
already adds substantial transaction costs to any significant SWF
transaction involving a U.S. entity."3 Aside from the added costs to
the SWF and the issuer of legal advisors that help the parties navigate
the CFIUS process, CFIUS also creates potentially costly delays if the
transaction is reviewed. By requiring officials to affirmatively sign off
on a decision not to investigate, FINSA creates pressure to
investigate which will undoubtedly increase the average time for
review of SWF deals.1 35
The CFIUS process also raises the possibility of political
mischief. The FINSA amendments to the CFIUS process created
broad and arguably political tests that may not be directly related to
the transaction itself and that may result in transaction approval
being tied to political concerns. For example, CFIUS is required to
consider: (a) "the adherence of the [SWFs] subject country to
nonproliferation control regimes"; 136 (b) "the relationship of such
country with the United States," specifically regarding its record of
cooperating with counter-terrorism efforts;137 and (c) "the potential
for transshipment or diversion of technologies with military
133. Although such subtle pressures would not always be apparent to regulators
because they would occur though non-public channels, sovereigns would face the risk that
companies would reveal such pressures. Most companies have welcomed SWF investment
under the assumption that SWFs are long-term, low-maintenance investors. If SWFs
change the rules, it seems unlikely that companies would play along, especially where
doing so runs the risk of derivative lawsuits from other shareholders. On the other hand, a
CFIUS investigation would also create problems for the company. What if CFIUS
ultimately required investment by the SWF? Selling a large block of shares would
certainly depress the stock price of the company.
134. Corr, supra note 117; see also Meghan D. Brady, Buy American (Unless You're
Foreign), CFO.coM, Feb. 7, 2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8659115/2/c_8668196?
f=home todayinfinance (discussing the relationship between foreign investment in U.S.
companies and the potential for national security breaches).
135. Corr, supra note 117.
136. See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(f)(9)(A) (West Supp. 2008).
137. § 2170(f)(9)(B).
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applications, including an analysis of national export control laws and
regulations. 138
Politicization of the CFIUS process can also result from both
private and governmental activities outside of CFIUS. Private parties
have repeatedly used the CFIUS process to achieve private gains.139
In 1990, for example, British Tire and Rubber (BTR) attempted a
hostile takeover of Massachusetts-based Norton Company. 140 Sixty_
four percent of Norton's shareholders accepted BTR's hostile
seventy-five dollar-per-share tender offer. 4 1  However, the deal
offered little protection for Norton employees, and a coalition
established by Norton employees collected 8,300 signatures in
opposition to the transaction and placed an advertisement in the Wall
Street Journal. Soon after, the legislature of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts passed a bill blocking BTR from replacing the Norton
board at the company's annual meeting. One hundred nineteen
members of Congress then wrote a letter to the president asking for
an investigation into the transaction, stating that BTR's acquisition of
Norton would not be in Norton's economic interest or in the interests
of national security.'42 However, another foreign company, French
conglomerate Saint-Gobain, stepped in to make a ninety dollar-per-
share offer.1 43 Norton was more pleased with this offer, and neither
Norton nor its surrogates raised objections on economic and national
security grounds.1" As two commentators noted,
[i]t is hard to imagine how a British acquisition of Norton
raised national security issues while a French acquisition did
not. There were no national security issues with the proposed
British acquisition; Norton simply did not want to be acquired
by BTR, and used a political campaign toward CFIUS to
prevent it.14
5
138. § 2170(f)(9)(C).
139. For a more detailed discussion of these transactions, see EDWARD M. GRAHAM
& DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NAT'L SEC. AND FOREIGN DIRECT INV. 123-41 (2006).
140. David Owen, BTR in Dollars 1.64bn Bid for Norton, FIN. TIMES (London), March
17, 1990, at 1.
141. See Andrew E. G. Jonas, Corporate Takeover and the Politics of Community: The
Case of Norton Company in Worcester, 68 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 348, 363-64 (Oct. 1992);
see also Saint-Gobain Offers Friendly Merger to Norton, 134 CERAMIC INDUS. 10, 10 (June
1, 1990).
142. See SYED ANWAR KARIM, DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, FOREIGN ACQUISITIONS
OF U.S. COMPANIES 15 (1995).
143. GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 139, at 124.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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In 2002, ST Telemedia, the second largest telecom in Singapore,
offered $250 million for a 61.5% stake in Global Crossing.146 Carl
Icahn was also interested in acquiring Global Crossing. XO
Communications, a company chaired by Icahn, sent a letter to the
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) requesting that the FCC
delay its review of the transaction "to ensure that all interested
parties have ample opportunity to assess the public interest
implications of the ST Telemedia takeover of Global Crossing by
extending the comment cycle in this proceeding until the DOJ and
CFIUS have concluded their review.' ' 147 According to an attorney
involved in the representation of Global Crossing, Icahn encouraged
congressional opposition to the transaction. 148  Arguing that the
transaction was unlikely to pass CFIUS review, Icahn sued to block
the transaction and force an auction of the now bankrupt Global
Crossing.
149
The potential for the politicization of CFIUS can also be seen in
two recent deals-involving state-owned companies, not SWFs-
which served to catalyze the FINSA amendments. In June 2005,
CNOOC, a state-controlled company, made an unsolicited, all-cash,
$18.5 billion bid for Unocal Oil Company. 5 ° The bid followed a $16.5
billion bid in cash and stock by Chevron.' The bid expectedly raised
political concerns,"' In July, the U.S. House of Representatives
voted 398-15 for a resolution asking President Bush to block the
transaction as a threat to national security. 153 Chevron then increased
146. See Judge Approves Sale of State in Global Crossing to ST Telecom, N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 2003, at C10 (discussing the court's later approval of this transaction).
147. Letter from Brian D. Oliver, Executive Vice President, Strategy and Corp. Dev.,
XO Comm., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec., Fed. Commc'n. Comm'n. (June 12, 2003),
available at http://sec.edgar-online.com/2003/06/13/0000950133-03-002164/Section7.asp.
148. GRAHAM & MARCHICK, supra note 139, at 126 (noting that author David
Marchick, then an attorney with Covington & Burling, represented Global Crossing in the
transaction).
149. Id.
150. See Xie Ye, CNOOC Launches Bid for Unocal Take-over, CHINA DAILY, June
24, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/24/content_454231.htm
(reporting the start of a potential take-over battle for Unocal).
151. See Ben White, Some Unocal Shareholders Reconsider Bid, WASH. POST, July 7,
2005, at D1 (discussing the political concerns surrounding CNOOC's bid for Unocal
Corp.).
152. China's Xinhua News Agency characterized the opposition as "unexpected," and
CNOOC complained that "[t]he unprecedented political opposition that followed the
announcement of our proposed transaction ... was regrettable and unjustified." CNOOC
Withdraws Unocal Bid, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 3, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/
archive/2005-08/03/content_1137165.htm.
153. H.R. Res. 344, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:h.res.00344: (follow "Text of Legislation" hyperlink).
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its bid to approximately $17 billion. Unocal asked CNOOC to
sweeten its bid to compensate for the inevitable delays as the Bush
administration conducted a lengthy review of the acquisition.154
CNOOC declined to increase its offer unless Unocal agreed to pay
the costs of terminating the Chevron transaction and "lobby for the
deal in the US Congress."'55 Unocal declined, and CNOOC withdrew
its bid.
The second contentious sale occurred with the 2006 takeover of
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), a UK
firm, by DP World. Following the takeover, DP World would assume
P&O's agreements to manage a number of major U.S. port facilities.
In late 2005, DP World approached CFIUS to discuss the
transaction. 5 6 In February 2006, P&O's stockholders approved the
transaction, and CFIUS reviewed the transaction and approved the
assumption of the port agreements.
57
Details of the DP World deal soon appeared in the financial
press. Shortly after the deal, DP World became a national press news
story as New York Senator Chuck Schumer criticized CFIUS
approval of the transaction.'58 Schumer was joined by a bipartisan
congressional coalition that called for a second review of the
transaction and possible legislative action to stop or unwind the
deal. 59 President Bush threatened to veto any such legislation,
claiming "it would send a terrible signal to friends and allies" to not
let the transaction go through.' 6
On March 8, 2006, a House Panel overwhelmingly voted to block
the deal.16' The following day, DP World released a statement saying
154. CNOOC Withdraws Unocal Bid, supra note 152.
155. Id.
156. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1 (2008),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
157. Id.
158. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Edward Alden, Dubai Ports Takeover Prompts
Backlash, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.ft.comlcms/s/d8156740-9f3f-
llda-ba48-0000779e2340,dwpuuid=5aedc8O4-2f7b-llda-8b51-
00000e251lc8,print=yes.html#.
159. Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, Strong Bipartisan Push To Pass
Emergency Legislation Suspending Dubai Port Deal Continues (Feb. 24, 2006), available
at http://schumer.senate.gov/schumerwebsite/pressroomlrecord.cfm?id=2594538.
160. Press Release, White House, President Discusses Port Security (Feb. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060221-2.html.
161. Ports Deal News Tracker, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB114071649414581503-6cMsd79XOW1Po8sqVIrCDN
tfFrg_20070417.html.
2008] 115
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that "[b]ecause of the strong relationship between the United Arab
Emirates and the United States[,] and to preserve this relationship[,]
... DP World will transfer fully the U.S. operations of P&O Ports
North America, Inc. to a United States entity."'62  DP World
eventually sold P&O's U.S. ports operations to an American
International Group subsidiary.163
As made clear in the foregoing examples, the key to success of
private efforts to exploit the CFIUS process is the encouragement of
congressional involvement, which was enhanced through the FINSA
amendments. FINSA provides for enhanced congressional oversight,
requiring CFIUS to report to:
(i) the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate,
(ii) the chair and ranking members of the Senate Banking
Committee and the House Financial Services Committee, (iii)
any House or Senate committee having oversight over the lead
agency in the CFIUS review, (iv) Senators and Members of
Congress from the district concerned, and implicitly (v)
governors whose states "interact" with the critical
infrastructure involved 64
As practitioners have argued, "[s]uch broad ranging, transaction-by-
transaction Congressional involvement in the potentially explosive
issue of foreign investment can only raise the risk of political
mischief, particularly where US constituents have an interest in
opposing a competing foreign investor." '165 The danger in the CFIUS
process is that political abuse is easily masked as the furtherance of a
legitimate task and the protection of national security. The risk of
such political or protectionist measures, however, is less investment in
the United States. For example, the head of China Investment Corp.
warned that his $200 billion SWF will avoid investing in countries that
use national security as an excuse for protectionism: "If an economy
will use national security as a criteria [sic] for entry of sovereign
wealth funds, we will be reluctant to tap the market because you are
162. Press Release, H. Edward Bilkey, Chief Operating Officer, DP World (Mar. 9
2006), available at http://portal.pohub.com/pls/pogprtl/docs/PAGE/DPWORLD_
WEBSITE/DPWORLDMEDIACENTREIMEDIACENTRENEWSRELEASES/
NEWSRELEASES 2006/17%20DPW%20PRESS%20STATEMENT.PDF.
163. Neil King Jr. & Greg Hitt, Dubai Ports World Sells U.S. Assets, WALL ST. J., Dec.
12, 2006, at A2.
164. Corr, supra note 117; see also Foreign Investment and National Security Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170
(West Supp. 2008) (describing the heightened oversight required by FINSA).
165. Corr, supra note 117.
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not sure what will happen .... [N]ational security should not be an
excuse for protectionism., 16
6
FINSA provided some assurance that CFIUS would not be used
politically after a transaction is approved by tailoring the CFIUS
evergreen" provision,167 which allows CFIUS to reopen an
investigation and stop or unwind a previously-cleared transaction.
Rather than allowing for an arbitrary reopening of an investigation
into an existing and approved investment, the CFIUS evergreen
provision has two firm triggers that provide some certainty to SWFs
with investment intentions. First, a transaction investigation may be
reopened "if any party to the transaction submitted false or
misleading material information to the Committee in connection with
the review or investigation or omitted material information, including
material documents, from information submitted to the
Committee."'68 Second, CFIUS may reopen an investigation: (1) "if
any party to the transaction or the entity resulting from
consummation of the transaction intentionally and materially
breaches a mitigation agreement"; (2) if the "breach is certified to the
Committee by the lead department or agency monitoring and
enforcing such agreement or condition as an intentional material
breach"; and (3) if CFIUS "determines that there are no other
remedies or enforcement tools available to address such breach."'69
The challenge for CFIUS is to satisfy its congressional reporting
mandate while also protecting itself from political pressures.
Ironically, the mitigation against political risk may be one-sided-
dangers against foreign political activity are mitigated, but increased
congressional oversight and involvement creates political risks for
SWFs.
FINSA will successfully discourage political investment by
SWFs. However, FINSA may also have the unintended effect of
discouraging active sovereign investors and perhaps even some
passive sovereign investors, unless experience with the CFIUS
process eases SWF concerns that CFIUS will be politicized.
The FINSA amendments have already had a pronounced effect
on deals, with CFIUS and firms acting in accordance with FINSA
166. Leonora Walet, China Investment Corp Warns Western Governments Against
Protectionism-Report, FORBES, Dec. 10, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/
2007/12/10/afx4424545.html.
167. Corr, supra note 117.
168. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(ii) (West Supp. 2008).
169. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(iii)(III) (West Supp. 2008).
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even before the effective date of the legislation. 7' Law firms
handling these matters note report that notifications to CFIUS in
2006 were seventy-four percent higher than in 2005, 171 and that
"CFIUS is receiving filings at a pace that, if maintained, would reach
approximately 150 cases for 2007, substantially exceeding the 113
filed in 2006. "1172 While filings have increased,'73 some argue that
actual SWF investment has not.174  In anticipation of the CFIUS
legislation, 2006 saw significant increases in the number of deals
escalated to the forty-five day investigation stage, the number of deals
in which CFIUS required mitigation, and the number of "informally
blocked" deals wherein investors simply pulled out of the CFIUS
review process. 175
CFIUS could be made less susceptible to politicization through
Treasury guidance requiring that "critical infrastructure" will be read
narrowly so that valid concerns for national security are not
exploited. Congress demonstrated awareness of the potential for
political misuse of CFJUS when it opted for a more limited scope of
CFIUS review. The final FINSA draft defines "critical
infrastructure" as systems or assets "so vital to the United States that
the incapacity or destruction of such systems or assets would have a
debilitating impact on national security.' 1 76 Earlier drafts included
much broader language that would have allowed critical
infrastructure to include "national economic security and national
public health or safety," terms that could be held to cover a very wide
range of benign investments. 177  However, even the limitation to
"national security" is still broad enough to invite mischief. 178  As
Attorney David Marchick has noted,
[T]here are certain areas of "critical infrastructure," broadly
defined, that in the ordinary course simply should not raise
national security concerns. For example, there has been great
170. See Corr, supra note 117.
171. Id.
172. John B. Reynolds, III, et al., supra note 122.
173. See Corr, supra note 117; see also Mihir Desai & Nihar Shah, The Deal Breaker,
THE AMERICAN, May 29, 2008, available at http://www.american.com/archive/2008/may-
june-magazine-contents/the-deal-breaker (explaining how the FINSA amendments have
increased the number of investigations performed by CFIUS).
174. See Corr, supra note 117.
175. See id.
176. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a)(6) (West Supp. 2008).
177. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2006, S. 3549, 109th Cong. (as
referred to H. Comm. after being received by Senate).
178. See § 2170 (a)(6).
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controversy in certain states regarding the privatization of toll
roads. While that debate is understandable, it would be far
more difficult to see how foreign ownership of a toll road would
raise national security issues. The same logic applies to most
investments in agriculture and food. Ben and Jerry's is owned
by a Dutch company, and Hdagen-Dazs is owned by Diageo, a
British company. I can think of many great ways to describe
Cherry Garcia, but central to national security isn't one of
them.17 9
To ensure that protectionism does not replace true concern for
national security, the Treasury Department will need to clarify that
the term "national security" is read to cover concerns that are truly
national, rather than related to a particular congressional district or a
particular firm, and concerns that are, in fact, related to security.
CFIUS will tend to be internally conflicted in its analysis because of
its committee structure and the different objectives of the various
departments with a seat on CFIUS. The intelligence agencies, for
example, may be less concerned with the economic effect of barriers
to entry than the Treasury Department. No agency, however, wants
to be responsible for letting military secrets slip through our borders
because of an investment by a SWF.
D. Expectations of Sovereign Wealth Funds as Shareholders
Having briefly sketched the regulatory framework in which
SWFs operate, this Section will now turn to the reasonable
expectations of regulators, directors, managers, and other
shareholders with respect to SWF behavior as shareholders within
this framework. This Article has thus far argued that existing
regulations compel passivity on the part of SWFs and thus minimize
the threat that equity investments will be used as political tools.
Aggressive use of the CFIUS process may create risks, however,
including loss of investment. Further, the passivity compelled by
existing regulations may not always be desirable. The term
''passivity" in the context of investor behavior is often equivocated.
When regulators and politicians expect SWFs to invest passively,
there are at least two ways in which the term may be used. First,
passivity may be defined as it is by the SEC. Under Exchange Act
179. The Impact of Foreign Ownership and Foreign Investment on the Security of our
Nation's Critical Infrastructure: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Trans. Sec. and
Infrastructure Protection, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of David Marchick, Covington
and Burling LLP), available at http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/2007051
6155704-95465.pdf.
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Rule 13d-1, passive investors are investors that "have not acquired
and do not hold the securities for the purpose of or with the effect of
changing or influencing the control of the issuers of the securities. "180
The second definition is not limited only to those investors that
do not intend to exercise control, but also those who are "passive
shareholders," with the term "passive" serving as an antonym to
"activist." '181 Thus, in contrast to this definition of activism, a passive
shareholder may be defined as a shareholder who is not only
disinterested in control but is also not involved in any activities that
may affect firm behavior or decision making. While practically all
investors fall within such a definition, there are a number of reasons
why SWFs should not be expected or required to assume such a role.
One disadvantage of passive investment is that the SWF may be
unwilling to engage with management; as noted by the Financial
Times, "the reason the sovereign funds have been given the
opportunity to invest in Wall Street's financial groups is precisely
because of misjudgments by managements that were either ignorant
of risks and contingent liabilities or tolerant of them. ' 182 However,
because of the risk of political backlash, SWFs may not encourage
needed reforms, as might other investors such as pension funds,
hedge funds, or private equity firms. For very large portfolio firms
such as many of the largest financial institutions, the kind of investor
activism pursued by private equity firms and hedge funds is not
possible. As explained by Blackstone chief executive Stephen
Schwarzman, "the scale of these companies dwarfs our ability to
make a meaningful contribution. We can't finance them with our
limited resources.' 1 83 As discussed above, hedge funds and private
equity firms control only a fraction of the wealth of SWFs. The
Financial Times also notes another advantage of SWFs:
[B]ecause they do not depend on borrowed money nearly as
much as private equity firms do to finance their stakes, the
180. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2008).
181. In a representative definition, Bernard Black describes shareholder activism as
"proactive efforts to change firm behavior or governance rules." BERNARD S. BLACK,
Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459, 459 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998).
182. Henny Sender, Silence Not Golden for Sovereign Funds, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0127cf0e-c5la-lldc-811a-0000779fd2ac,Authorised
=false.html?_i location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F127cf0e
-c5la-lldc-811a-0000779fd2ac.html%3Fnclick check%3Dl& i referer=&nclickcheck
=1.
183. Id.
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companies in which they invest do not become loaded with
debt. 'The sovereign funds are safer and less risky owners than
private equity because they can live with lower leverage and
lower returns,' says a senior banker in New York."8
The rise of sovereign wealth funds comes in an era of increased
institutional investor activism. Institutional investors generally have
grown in importance, both as a function of their relative size in the
market, and because proxy advisors and other corporate governance
industry firms enable institutional investors to overcome many of the
collective action problems, which in the past made greater investor
activism infeasible.185 Institutional investor activism has significantly
affected corporate governance in the United States in recent years,
most notably in removing anti-takeover protections and requiring
majority voting for election of directors. 86
Like institutional investors, it should be expected that many, if
not most, funds will want to use this environment to their advantage
and take an active governance role, at least in the sense of engaging
with management and the board and exercising shareholder voting
rights. SWFs have not and are not likely to behave according to a
single paradigm. Rather, some SWFs may invest like socially-
conscious pension or mutual funds, some may invest aggressively like
some hedge funds, and some may invest passively like many mutual
funds.187 SWFs may be voluntarily passive for several reasons. A
SWF may determine to remain a passive investor for the same reason
that many investors remain passive: it is economically rational to
remain passive when activism is unlikely to result in any appreciable
economic benefit for the SWF, perhaps because the investment is
relatively small and significant expenditure of resources would result
in insignificant gains. Like other investors, SWFs will vote on
corporate matters. SWFs may also attempt to place proposals on a
portfolio company's proxy (although apparently this has yet to
occur).
An expectation of this broader form of passivity by SWFs may
deter legitimate investments. To require such passivity as an implicit
condition to investment negates the essential nature of equity
184. Id.
185. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897-98
(2007).
186. See GEORGESON, 2007 ANNUAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REVIEW 6-7
(2007), available at http://www.georgeson.comlusa/download/acgr/acgr2007.pdf.
187. See supra notes 8-23 and accompanying text (describing various investments
made by SWFs).
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investment. 188 On the other hand, an active role in governance
(presumably by the professional managers of SWFs, who are typically
drawn from the ranks of fiduciary institutional investor firms) may
prove beneficial. Active minority shareholders are often of
significant benefit to their portfolio companies. One such example is
Nelson Peltz, who holds minority positions in, among many firms,
Heinz and Wendy's.89 Peltz has pushed through a number of changes
at both companies, and both companies appear to have benefited
significantly as a result. 9 °
Likewise, Saudi Prince Al-waleed Bin Talal's Kingdom Holding
Company (KHC) is cited as a model minority shareholder.19' One of
KHC's investment philosophies is
a strategy for long-term investments, [seeking] businesses with
strong management teams that are capable of delivering
sustained growth and continuously strong returns. [KHC]
intends to continue to support management teams while
seeking to be an active investor taking investment positions
large enough to give KHC a voice in the strategic management
of its portfolio companies. 19
2
Prince Al-waleed owns approximately 4.3% of Citibank yet made
front-page news when in early 2007 he publicly called on Citigroup to
"take draconian measure[s] to control the costs. ' '193 After Al-waleed
spoke out, Citigroup accelerated cost cutting measures.'94 While
Prince Al-waleed's role in the cost-cutting decision and the effect of
the decision are debatable, a more important measure of his influence
188. Such a requirement is nearly converse to the practice of empty voting; both
practices separate economic interest from activism, with empty voting retaining voting
power and no economic interest, and passive shareholding retaining economic interest but
avoiding any form of activism. For a discussion of the practice of empty voting and other
types of vote manipulation, see Bernard Black & Henry Hu, The New Vote Buying:
Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 929-36
(2006); Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 1, 19-28
(2006).
189. Julie Jargon, Peltz Uses "Common Sense" to Reshape Food Industry, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 11, 2007, at Al.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Ignore the Murk and Myths of Sovereign Funds, INFORMED (The
Investor Relations Society, Europe), Dec. 13, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.ir-
soc.org.uk/files/ pdflbulletin/bulletin243.pdf.
192. Kingdom Holding Company, Investment Philosophy, http://www.kingdom.com.sa/
en/InvPInvPhilosophy.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
193. David Wighton, Alwaleed Urges Draconian Moves on Costs at Citigroup, FIN.
TIMES, July 18, 2006, at 1, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=
fto071820061444591170.
194. Cracks in the Edifice, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 2007, at 89.
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as an investor is seen later in 2007. In an interview with Fortune
magazine, Prince Al-waleed stated that he spoke to then-CEO
Charles Prince regularly, and during the subprime crisis they spoke
"almost every two or three days. Four or five calls over the past [ten]
days."'95 Prince Al-waleed was later thought to have influenced the
ouster of Charles Prince when he withdrew his support of Prince after
Citigroup acknowledged the need for an $8 to $11 billion write-off
related to the subprime crisis. 9 6
While SWFs may raise concerns over investor intent, engaged
SWFs would likely be better co-shareholders-from the perspective
of other long-term investors-than highly leveraged, activist hedge
funds and private equity firms, as engaged SWFs may be able to make
investments that such firms cannot. Markets have tended to react
positively to SWF investments, suggesting that shareholders are not
overly concerned with the possibility of political activity by SWFs. 97
Further, shareholders may recognize that by welcoming investments
by SWFs, companies are more likely to be welcome in the SWF
sponsor country. 98 The benefits attributable to a large, stable
shareholder may be part of the explanation for the surge in Sony
stock price following a large investment by Dubai's SWF. 19 9 In
Tokyo, Sony stock closed up 4.6%. oo After CIC's announcement that
it would invest in Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stanley's shares rose
nearly 6% (versus a 1.67% gain by the S&P 500 on the same day).2"'
In the case of Mubadala's investment in AMD, the share price
performed as well as the sector overall; in Dubai's investment in
Citigroup, the share price underperformed the market but
outperformed its sector. °z
195. Serwer & Gimbel, supra note 102 (quoting interview with Prince Al-waleed).
196. Id. Note that the type of beneficial influence exercised by Al-waleed would likely
be found to constitute "control" under the Treasury's new CFIUS rules. See supra note 82
and accompanying text.
197. Vidhi Chhaochharia and Luc Laeven, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Their Investment
Strategies and Performance 23, 43 (Working Paper, Aug. 31, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1262383.
198. While such quid pro quo activities may not result in the most efficient allocation
of resources, shareholders would hardly sell off the stock of a company that may receive a
preferential treatment by virtue of welcoming SWF investment.
199. Peter Sayer, Dubai Investment Fund Buys Stake in Sony, PC WORLD, Nov. 27,
2007, http://www.pcworld.comlbusinesscenter/article/139929/dubai-investmentfund-buys
_stake in sony.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
200. Id.
201. Chris Oliver, Details of CIC's Stake in Morgan Stanley Revealed, MARKET
WATCH, Dec. 24, 2007, http://www'marketwatch'com/news/story/details-cics-stake-morgan
-stanley/story.aspx?guid=% 7B6175589F-C8D1-49AE-8FA4-EB61BF8F7AC2% 7D.
202. Id.
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Market Reactions to SWF Investment
CIC - Morgan
Stanley + 5.84% 1.67% (S&P 500) 1.9% (Merrill Lynch)
Dubai - -1.24% (money center
Citigroup -0.50% 1.49% (S&P 500) banks sector)
Mubadala - -0.47% (semiconductor-
AMD -0.47% 0.52% (S&P 500) broad sector)
Dubai World - 1.54% (NYSE 1.51% (Las Vegas Sands
MGM + 8.92% Comp.) Corp.)
Singapore &
"Middle East" 0.80% (NYSE -0.58% (ABN Amro
- UBS + 2.34% Comp.) Holdings N.V.)
-1.99% (Koninklijke
Dubai - Sony + 1.89% 1.66% (Nikkei 225) Philips Electronic)
On the other hand, a recent, preliminary study suggests that
while SWF investment has initially been viewed as a positive, share
prices of SWF portfolio companies have tended to drop over time. 3
The study's authors suggest that the decrease may be attributable to
concerns that SWFs will be used as political tools.
2 4
In some cases however, SWFs already act like other large
institutional investors, such as public pension funds.205 A number of
the largest SWFs, including Norway's Government Pension Fund-
Global,2°6 Singapore's Temasek fund,207 and Alaska's Permanent
203. See Veljko Fotak et al., The Financial Impact of Sovereign Wealth Fund
Investments in Listed Companies 3 (Working Paper, Mar. 18, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108585.
204. Id. at 2-3, 7.
205. One money manager speculates that SWFs will behave like pension plans in terms
of asset allocation, with portfolios of approximately 60% equities, 30% bonds, and 10%
alternatives. See George Hoguet, Market Insight: Sovereign Funds Should Be Watched
with Caution, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a20ca2ec-
a8d6-lldc-ad9e-0000779fd2ac.html. If all SWFs were to index 60% of their assets to, as an
example, the FTSE Global All Cap index, they would collectively own around 4.6% of the
7,805 companies in the index. However, note that these numbers may not hold true for
SWFs controlled by Islamic states, since certain forms of lending may violate Shari'ah law.
For a discussion of the asset allocation of petrodollar SWFs, see FARRELL ET AL., supra
note 43, at 53.
206. Norwegian Ministry of Finance, The Global Pension Fund,
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topicslThe-Government-Pension-Fund
.html ?id=1441 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (providing detailed disclosures on Norway's
Government Pension Fund-Global).
207. Temasek Holdings, http://www.temasekholdings.com.sg/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008)
(showing Temasek's disclosures).
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Fund 208  provide information on size, results, and portfolio
composition. SWFs may signal how they will exercise their votes as
shareholders by disclosing proxy voting policies, as Alaska does.209
Some SWFs, especially Western SWFs, will likely seek to be
activist in ways similar to pension funds. For example, like pension
funds concerned with the detrimental effects of certain products on
their pensioners, SWFs may choose to avoid investment in tobacco
companies because a significant portion of the country's health
expenditures are related to diseases associated with tobacco usage.
Norway's SWF recently announced that it was initiating a review of
such problematic investments. Finance Minister Kristin Halvorsen
said the fund would report to parliament on its investments in 2008,
and that "[p]roduction of tobacco, gambling for instance, nations that
break human rights ... the sex industry these are entirely concrete
issues" that the fund would consider. 210 Norway's SWF has signed
on211 to the UN's "Principle for Responsible Investment" ("PRI"),2 12
a set of non-binding best practices. Funds publicly indicate their
acceptance of the best practices by becoming signatories to the PRI
via a UN website.213 Among other things, PRI signatories pledge to
incorporate environmental, social, and governance ("ESG") issues
into investment analysis and decision-making processes. They
propose to do so through investment policy statements, support for
ESG-related tools, metrics, and analyses, and encouragement of the
adoption of ESG measures by financial analysts, consultants, brokers,
research firms, or rating companies.214 PRI signatories also pledge to
208. The Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation, http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/
home/index.cfm (for the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation's disclosures) (last visited
Nov. 9, 2008).
209. See, e.g., ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORPORATION, RESOLUTION OF THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES SETrING OUT INVESTMENT POLICIES RELATING TO PUBLICLY
TRADED SECURITIES, RESOLUTION 07-07, 9 (2007) available at http://dev.apfc.org/
_amiResolutions/Res_07-07.pdf.
210. John Acher, Tobacco, Gambling, Sex Face Norway Oil Fund Test, REUTERS, Jan.
16, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKL1623708420080116. Norway has
already divested its fund of holdings in companies that make nuclear weapons and cluster
bomb components. Norway's Global Pension Fund Drops 3 Weapon Producers Over
Ethics Concerns, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 11, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/
articles/ ap/2008/01/11/business/EU-FIN-Norway-Oil-Fund-Ethics.php.
211. Principles for Responsible Investment, Signatories to the Principles for
Responsible Investment, http://unpri.org./signatories/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
212. Principles for Responsible Investment, About, http://unpri.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2008).
213. Principles for Responsible Investment, supra note 211.
214. Principles for Responsible Investment, The Principles for Responsible
Investment, http://unpri.org./principles/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
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be active owners by creating and exercising shareholder rights in
accordance with a disclosed ESG policy.215
Given the forces that encourage SWFs to act passively and
apolitically, it is unlikely that many SWFs will join Norway as active
ESG investors through the UN's PRI or their own ESG criteria
(although the number of signatory SWFs may not be significant, at
least in the near future). A more likely general trend will be
adherence to a corporate governance policy that ultimately
emphasizes share value maximization or investment on economic
grounds, such as the policy set out in the Santiago Principles.216 Of
the funds that have disclosed voting policies, Alaska's Permanent
Fund has indicated a policy of engagement and support for greater
shareholder rights, but the ultimate goal of its policies is "the best
financial interest of the Fund," 17 rather than a set of social policies.
Existing U.S. regulations already promote the right kind of
passivity-a non-controlling minority stake, with the ability of CFIUS
to counteract most political activity. Complete passivity, however, is
not necessary for the protection of U.S. interests. Further, imposing
passivity on SWFs might merely push SWFs to invest in other
jurisdictions with lax regulatory standards or political impotence to
protect themselves against opportunistic SWF activities. In such
jurisdictions, SWFs could operate without the reporting and
corporate governance restraints imposed by U.S. law. Certainly, even
SWFs in search of benign, diversified investment opportunities will
invest in jurisdictions outside the United States. However, legislators
and regulators should be wary of any changes that would encourage
or accelerate a shift in SWF investments away from the U.S. 218
215. Id.
216. Santiago Principles GAPP.19 states "[t]he SWF's investment decisions should aim
to maximize risk-adjusted financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment
policy, and based on economic and financial grounds. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note
32, at 22.
217. ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP., RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
SETTING OUT INVESTMENT POLICIES RELATING TO EQUITY SECURITIES, RESOLUTION
05-05 (2005), available at http://www.apfc.org/_amiResolutions/Res05_- 05.pdf.
218. There is some evidence that this is already occurring. See generally Press Release,
Monitor Group, Monitor Group Research Reveals Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment
Shift from Western Markets to Middle East, North Africa and Asia (October 7, 2008),
available at http://www.monitor.com/Portals/O/MonitorContentldocuments[MonitorQ2-
SWF.press-release.pdf.
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III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT
The manner in which SWFs invest in U.S. enterprises suggests
that, at present investment levels, there is limited risk that SWFs will
use equity investment as a political tool. To the extent that SWFs
engage in political investment, it will likely not involve visible
investments in highly regulated enterprises or sensitive industries in
entities domiciled in jurisdictions that, like the United States, have
enacted legislation such as FINSA. Instead, the most significant
political investment may concern less monitored, less regulated
investments in emerging economies. For example, China has
committed funds to many investments in Africa and Asia.2 19 While
such investments almost certainly involve financial concerns, there
are likely political advantages to such investments. Some investments
might provide insurance that certain natural and strategic resources
will continue to flow to China exclusively or at preferential prices.
Other regional investments may be valuable because they create ties
with other sovereigns or regions within another sovereign. However,
such investments could pose serious risks to the United States. It is in
the best interests of the United States and other host countries to
ensure that SWFs will act apolitically and transparently wherever
they choose to invest.
A. Individual Country Responses
There are a variety of approaches that other governments have
attempted in dealing with sovereign investment. The U.K., for
example, has a provision that allows the government to intervene in
mergers that affect national security 2 ° The German government has
redrafted its foreign investment rules to allow for a vetting process
219. MICHAEL F. MARTIN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CHINA'S SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUND 9-10 (2008), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34337_2008
0122.pdf (detailing investments within China); Sovereign Wealth Fund Inst., China-Africa
Development Fund, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/cad.php (last visited Nov. 9, 2008)
(describing the Fund's focus on Africa); Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, China
Investment Corporation, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund/cic.php (last visited Nov. 9,
2008) (citing CIC investments both within China and in Japan).
220. In response to concerns over SWF investments, U.K. Chancellor Alistair Darling
stated:
If it became clear that a company was not acting in a commercial way, or we had
reason to believe it was going to make an investment in this country where there
were issues of national security, for example, then we have powers under the
existing Enterprise Act to take action.
Sumeet Desai, Darling Says Sovereign Funds Need to Follow Rules, REUTERS, Oct.
22, 2007, http:lluk.reuters.comarticle/fundsNews/idUKNOA22927320071022.
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similar to the CFIUS process. 21 Under the legislation, German
officials could prohibit transactions in which a stake of twenty five
percent or more is acquired if the acquisition could threaten "public
security or order." '222 As with CFIUS, the German legislation
arguably protects against external political influence at the expense of
potential internal political mischief. Germany is perhaps chiefly
concerned with Russian influence. In 2006, Russian state-controlled
bank OAO Vneshtorgbank acquired a five percent stake in European
Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. ("EADS"), a parent of Airbus. In
a move similar to U.S. firms' responses to SWF investments, EADS
informed the bank that despite the relatively large stake, it would not
consider allowing the bank a seat on the board, nor would it allow it
to influence corporate governance. 23 Unlike many SWFs, however,
the Russian firm was more likely pursuing political goals as well as
financial goals, evidenced by a comment from Sergei Prikhodko, an
aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin, stating that: "A holding by
the state makes sense when we can take decisions or have an
influence .... If we see an economic interest as well, then we will
insist on having a stake, thanks to which we would have at least a
blocking minority., 224
France has also expressed concern with SWF investment, with
French president Nicolas Sarkozy declaring that: "In the face of the
increasing power of extremely aggressive speculative funds and
sovereign funds which do not obey economic logic [France is taking]
the political and strategic choice to protect its companies, to give
them the means to defend and develop themselves., 25 Australia has
developed what appears to be potentially (depending on regulatory
application) the most protectionist response to SWFs by reviewing
foreign investment through a six factor analysis involving: (1) the
investor's independence from the relevant foreign government; (2)
221. Agence-France Presse, Germany Moves to Block Sovereign Wealth Funds,
INDUSTRY WK. (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://www.industryweek.com/Read
Article.aspx?ArticlelD=17121.
222. Id.
223. Kevin Done, EADS Chiefs Warn Off Moscow, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15,
2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6caf98la-4456-lldb-8965-0000779e2340.html- (last visited
Nov. 9, 2008).
224. Russia Could Seek Blocking Minority Stake in EADS Eventually-Putin Advisor,
FORBES, Sept. 12, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2006/09/12/afx3010
667.html.
225. Helen Beresford, Sarkozy to Use CDC to Defend French Cos Against 'Aggressive'
Speculators, FORBES.COM, Jan. 8, 2008, http://www.forbes.comlafxnewslimited/feeds/afx
2008/01/08/afx4505120.html.
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the investor's behavior under the law and "common standards of
business behaviour[;]" (3) the impact of the investment on
competition; (4) the impact on government revenue and policies,
including tax; (5) national security; and (6) whether "an investment
may impact on the operations and directions of an Australian
business, as well as its contribution to the Australian economy and
broader community".226
In the developing world, Indian Finance Minister P.
Chidambaram has expressed concern about foreign investment,
declaring that "[i]t is important for developing countries to avoid
shocks.... Regulation must stay one step ahead of innovation." '227
Under Indian law, foreign investors must be registered with the state
securities regulator, SEBI, and are allowed to invest only through
participatory notes.228 New rules impose a limitation on "proprietary
notes" investments, and SEBI now exercises tighter control over
registration renewals. 229
Thailand is also determined to implement investment
restrictions. New regulations require that some foreign investors sell
holdings or voting rights exceeding fifty percent of the outstanding
stock of Thai companies.230 The restrictions arose as a result of the
sale by former Prime Minister Thaksin to Singaporean SWF Temasek
of a majority stake in the Thai telecom company Shin.23' The
acquisition "galvanized public protests against Thaksin [majority
owner and former prime minister], eventually culminating in the
September coup. The military leaders who staged the coup are intent
on showing that the Shin sale was illegitimate to justify removing
Thaksin. ' '232  After the negative reaction, however, Temasek was
226. Marc Moncrief, Swan Gives Foreign Governments a Peek at FIRB Guidelines,
Bus. DAY, Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://business.theage.com.aubusiness/swan-gives-
foreign-governments-a-peek-at-firb-guidelines-20080217-lsnl.html#.
227. US Treasury Secretary Paulson Pushes India to Speed Up Opening of Financial
Markets, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/10/30/
business/AS-FIN-India-US-Paulson.php.
228. For a background on these regulations, see generally INDIA MINISTRY OF FIN.,
DEP'T OF ECON. AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON ENCOURAGING FII
FLOWS AND CHECKING THE VULNERABILITY OF CAPITAL MARKETS TO SPECULATIVE
FLOWS (2005), available at http://finmin.nic.inlthe-ministry/dept-eco-affairs/
capital-market-div/Report EGFII.pdf.
229. Joe Leahy, Bull Run Is Brought to the Ground, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2007,
http://us.ft.comlftgatewaylsuperpage.ft?newsid=fto101720071847208990.
230. Thomas Fuller & Wayne Arnold, Thailand Threatens Fresh Restrictions on
Foreign Investors, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 9, 2007, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/ 09/businessfbaht.php.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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determined to avoid sensitive investments. The chairman of Temasek
stated that Temasek would avoid investing in "iconic" companies
overseas, instead opting for minority stakes in future investments and
seeking local partners in acquisitions, such as through joint venture
agreements: "We've got to take various factors into account, such as
whether the company or the activity is iconic for that country,
whether it will arouse all kinds of emotional sentiments. 233
The problem for host nations concerned with SWF investment is
that imposing strict foreign investment rules may put them at a
competitive disadvantage compared to countries not adopting or
enforcing such rules. There are at least two non-exclusive solutions
to this problem. The first is the creation of a common set of
regulations (such as through a multi-national treaty), and the second
is the creation of "soft law"-a set of voluntary best practices that will
guide SWF sponsor nations.
In either case, managing SWF investments requires two steps.
First, following the example of the United States, host nations should
create clear, enforceable regulations that will protect national security
and politically sensitive assets with the goal of providing a clear
framework for SWFs undertaking investment in a given country.
However, countries will have different standards for investment and
acceptable disclosure. Also some countries may not have the political
power to prohibit undesirable SWF behavior. Others may lack the
political will to prevent SWF investments in their country from being
used as political tools against other countries. As a second level of
regulation, international agreements or voluntary codes of best
practices would provide a common set of rules. While not providing a
host nation the ability to enforce its regulations on SWF operations
outside its markets, they would nevertheless, fill gaps in individual
country regulation. These rules would provide additional certainty
for SWFs' transactions to the benefit of both the sovereign and the
host nation.
B. Multilateral Agreements
Multilateral agreements, such as a treaty negotiated through the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"), provide an attractive solution
to the risks associated with SWF investment. In contrast to a set of
voluntary best practices, the multilateral agreement would be
enforceable by the country through WTO dispute resolution
233. Temasek to Avoid Politically Sensitive Investments, YAHOO! ASIA NEWS, Nov. 23,
2007, http://asia.news.yahoo.com/071123/3/3be57.htmi.
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proceedings. The difficulty in setting up a multilateral agreement for
SWFs, however, is demonstrated by the number of unsuccessful
attempts that have been made in the recent past to develop a
multilateral framework for foreign direct investment generally. In
1995, members of the OECD, led by France, engaged in discussions
on a possible Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI").234 The
objective of the MAI was "to provide a broad multilateral framework
for international investment with high standards for the liberalisation
of investment regimes and investment protection and with effective
dispute settlement procedures, open to non-Members. 23 5 However,
the inability of OECD members to come to terms, combined with
increasingly high-profile protests against the MAI, ended discussions
by 1998.236
The World Trade Organization also put a Multilateral
Investment Agreement ("MIA") on the agenda for the Doha round
of trade talks237 but developed and developing countries failed to
reach a consensus on the MIA. A particular sticking point was the
requirement of transparency for member countries (which was
essentially a requirement that developing countries operate
transparently). 238 Ultimately, the issue of foreign investment was
dropped from the Doha agenda in 2004.239
Trade talks involving SWFs would also face the same difficulties
as multilateral foreign investment agreements. There would first be
difficulties in achieving a consensus among countries accepting
sovereign investment because the political risks associated with
sovereign investment differ by country and by sovereign investor.
For example, Germany may be more concerned with investment from
Russia than investment by Abu Dhabi. On the other hand, the wide
gulf between the interests of developed and developing nations that
234. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
NEGOTIATING GROUP ON THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT (MAI)
(1995), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/dgl/dgla951e.pdf (discussing the
agenda of the drafting group).
235. Organisation for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Multilateral Agreement on
Investment, http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,2340,en_2649_201185_18948191_1 1
1,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
236. See EDWARD GRAHAM, INT'L INST. OF ECON., FIGHTING THE WRONG ENEMY:
ANTIGLOBAL AcrIVISTS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 10-12 (2000).
237. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
238. Members Divided Over Transparency, Definition at WTO Investment Talks,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Vol. 6, No. 15 (April 23, 2002) at 2.
239. World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the
General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (2004).
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proved insurmountable in earlier foreign investment talks may
narrow somewhat when it comes to SWFs. Many SWFs are
sponsored by sovereigns that accept significant foreign and sovereign
investment. As a result, these SWFs might be expected to have an
interest in a balanced approach to SWF regulation. Further, there are
fewer nations that have SWFs at or near the top of their trade
agendas: namely a couple dozen major sovereign investors and the
G7 economies. Thus, one might envision a simpler trade process than
the Doha trade negotiations.
Wall Street Journal columnist Bob Davis argues for a two-step
SWF trade discussion.24° In the first stage, the United States, Europe
and Canada would work out common positions on issues such as
whether government funds should be limited to minority stakes,
whether certain companies, such as defense and media companies
should be off-limits to any investment, and whether countries whose
funds invest in certain sectors such as financial services should be
required to open those same sectors in their domestic markets to
foreign investment. 24' A failure to coordinate, he argues, could result
in funds playing "one country against another to attract investment,
like auto makers play one state in the United States against another
to get a richer package of tax cuts." '242 In the second stage, the SWF
sponsor countries would participate in the interest of "maintaining
the freest possible access to invest in the world's richest markets." '243
If the talks ended in failure, the United States and Europe could
unilaterally impose rules.
While a trade agreement may be preferable in the long term
because of enforceability, there are disadvantages as well. First,
assuming even host nations (or even a smaller group of host nations,
as Davis posits) could come to common terms on the content of such
an agreement, such a process could take years.2" Finalizing an
agreement with sovereign investors would likely be an even longer
process. But SWFs are already investing now, and SWFs are rapidly
increasing in size. The glacial pace of trade negotiations is ill-suited
to deal with the pressing concerns of global capital flows in the near
term. Further, some sovereign investors such as China have strongly
240. Bob Davis, How Trade Talks Could Tame Sovereign-Wealth Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 29, 2007, at A2.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See id. ("The funds now have between $2 trillion and $3 trillion to invest, a kitty
that could reach $10 trillion within a decade.").
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resisted calls for further regulation of SWFs, essentially threatening
to take their capital to other markets if Western nations decide to
change the rules.245
Because of these concerns, to date both the United States and
the European Union have promoted the adoption of best practices, or
codes of conduct, for SWFs. The emphasis thus far has been on
voluntary self-regulation. The goal is to engage sovereign investors in
discussions of appropriate investment objectives and procedures
while minimizing the risk that the sovereign investors will simply
invest in other markets. Losing SWF investments would multiply
concerns for the United States and the EU. Each would have less
money funding domiciled firms yet would still be affected by the risk
of political activity through investment in other markets. However,
because these codes are voluntary, the enforcement leverage for the
United States and other host nations is largely political and economic.
Countries like Japan, the United States and EU member states that
have significant political power and large amounts of two-way cash
flows between them and SWF sponsor countries should have the
leverage to push codes of best practices. Countries that have less
leverage may be the beneficiaries of such efforts, but will be more
susceptible to the risks posed by political and mixed-motive use of
SWF investment because they lack the political and economic power
to "enforce" voluntary codes of conduct. Even the ability of more
powerful countries to compel adherence to codes of conduct may
erode over time. Thus, voluntary codes of conduct should be
understood as a first step that addresses an immediate need, while
more comprehensive foreign investment rules should be negotiated
through a future round of trade talks, as unpredictable as the
outcome of such talks may be.
C. Voluntary Codes of Conduct
Ideally, detailed best practices would be created by, or in
connection with, sovereign investors. However, host nations are
already working toward outlining best practices for SWFs. In the
United States, Treasury officials have informally suggested a
framework for best practices, 6 and on March 19, 2008, the Treasury
Department reached an agreement with Abu Dhabi and Singapore
245. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Kimmitt, supra note 54, at 4 (suggesting that economic factors should
drive SWF investment decisions and that SWFs should operate transparently).
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on a set of policy principles based on those best practices.247 More
formally, the Commission of the European Communities has recently
set out some major governance principles for sovereign investors:
* The clear allocation and separation of responsibilities
in the internal governance structure of a SWF;
* The development and issuance of an investment policy
that defines the overall objectives of SWF investment;
* The existence of operational autonomy for the entity to
achieve its defined objectives;
* Public disclosure of the general principles governing a
SWF's relationship with governmental authority;
* The disclosure of the general principles of internal
governance that provide assurances of integrity;
* The development and issuance of risk-management
policies.2 48
The G7249 finance ministers also suggested that the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the World Bank, and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") draft a set of
principles that sovereign investors could use in managing their SWFs.
Specifically, a draft memorandum of the G7 ministers tasked the
IMF, World Bank and OECD with creating best practices "in such
areas as institutional structure, risk management, transparency and
accountability.""2 ' The result of this mandate is the relatively sparse
Santiago Principles, a set of "generally accepted principles and
practices" created by a working group comprised of representatives
from twenty-six SWF sponsor-nation representatives, working in
coordination with IMF officials."' This Article now turns to a
247. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Reaches Agreement on
Principles for Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment with Singapore and Abu Dhabi (Mar.
20, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releaseshp881.htm (noting that SWF
should invest based on economic rather than political factors).
248. Commission Proposal for a Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth
Funds, at 9, COM (2008) 115 final (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
commissionbarroso/president/pdf/COM2008-115en.pdf.
249. The G7, or Group of Seven, refers to the United States, Japan, Germany, France,
United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada (in this context, the finance ministers of these
countries).
250. G7 Warns of Risks from U.S. Housing Slump, MARKET WATCH, Feb. 9, 2008,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/g7-warns-global-risk-us/story.aspx?guid=l0382
9F31-7840-464C-992A-D5FDE6407532} (quoting Communique, Group of Seven Finance
Chiefs, Feb. 9, 2008).
251. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 1.
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discussion of whether the Santiago Principles address or mitigate the
major concerns in these four areas.
1. Structure
For many SWFs, there is little to no information on their
structure, size, investments, and investment objectives. The
somewhat ad hoc formation of many SWF funds suggests that many
start with an initially loose structure that is tightened and
strengthened as the SWF grows in size and begins to operate in global
capital markets, with all the political implications such operations
entail. A report by State Street, a financial services firm, describes
the makeshift development of SWF structures:
Sometimes-and especially with commodity exporting
economies-authorities find themselves faced with unexpected
windfall revenues that come from a positive terms-of-trade
shock. They often respond by ringfencing and accumulating at
least part of these proceeds offshore-mainly for sterilization
purposes, but also to smooth out potential volatility in budget
revenues. Very soon, what started out as a deposit at the
central bank or a special purpose account at the Treasury often
gets redesigned into a separate fund structure, with its own
identity, system of governance and set of rules. Then, as assets
in the fund continue to grow beyond the original narrowly
defined purpose, authorities may take a step back and revisit
the broader objectives, design, and structure of the fund.
Often, this could lead to some sort of a split into a liquidity
tranche and a longer-term investment tranche 2
The report further argues that creating appropriate structures for
SWFs should begin with the definition of liabilities of the fund. 3
Most traditional funds begin with a definition of the liabilities of the
funds, and then work towards a structure appropriate to the funds.254
Many SWFs operate with similar objectives to many of these
traditional funds, and so could adopt similar structures. Consider the
structure of pension funds. Pension funds are generally managed by
professional fund managers, and are ultimately governed by a board
of directors. Board members may be selected by existing board
members or, in the case of a governmental fund such as a retirement
252. ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 1.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. at 1.
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fund for government employees, may be political appointees. In
this structure, there are two layers of fiduciary responsibility.2 6 First,
the professional investment advisers are fiduciaries with respect to
the plan. Second, the board members are also fiduciaries with respect
to the beneficiaries of the fund. The principal difference between
SWFs and pension funds (as well as all of the other types of
investment funds-mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity
funds) is the protection of fiduciary duties with the latter and in many
cases the absence of fiduciary duties with the former.257 In the case of
pension and other traditional investment funds, the fiduciary concept
(enforced by the sovereign) provides a check against imprudent or
political behavior; no such rules bind SWF activities.
Some of the benefits of a traditional fund structure may be
achieved by hiring outside fund managers. 8  Currently, many of
these funds are hiring outside help as a signal of investment intent.
By making investments through outside money mangers, the SWFs
and their sovereign sponsors are more removed from the investment
decision and companies are somewhat better protected from being
used as political vehicles. Professional SWF managers may see their
role as akin to that of a pension fund manager, with political
appointees on the supervising board.
There are limits to the benefits of structure alone, however. For
example, although professional managers could be considered
fiduciaries to the fund and to the sovereign beneficiary, the sovereign
is managing the fund for its own purposes. The sovereign cannot
practically be considered as owing an actionable fiduciary duty to its
citizens unless the sovereign determines to bind itself. Further, the
relationship between the managers and the sovereign is not identical
to the traditional relationship between investment advisers and a
255. See, e.g., Neil Weinberg, Sanctimonious in Sacramento, FORBES, May 10, 2004,
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2004/0510/052-print.html (discussing the California Public
Employees' Retirement System pension fund board's mix of "politicians, political
appointees and union reps").
256. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 405(c)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (2000).
257. See Investment Advisors Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006). See
generally TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL
FUNDS AND ADVISERS (rev. ed. 2004) (describing SEC and other regulations pertaining
to money managers). While there may be similar fiduciary duties between a sovereign
and a professional money manager, there is not a fiduciary duty between the sovereign
and the ultimate purported beneficiary of the fund-the citizens of the sovereign.
258. See ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 1 (indicating that external managers play a major
role from the beginning of a traditional fund's lifecycle while SWFs typically do not hire
external managers until much later).
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fund. The nature of the relationship is not that of a powerful bank
and an individual investor with neither the time nor investment skill
to manage her retirement funds effectively. While fiduciary
regulations and patterns of practice govern a traditional
adviser/advisee relationship, many of the rules and patterns are
inapposite to advisers of SWFs. A pension fund's adviser-fiduciary
will invest according to a "prudent man" standard,259 which provides
predictability to the fund's governors, the fund's beneficiaries, and to
the market as a whole. On the other hand, a SWF adviser may, under
pressure from a host country, set up a structure that imposes similar
"prudent man" requirements. In this instance, however there is no
enforcement mechanism that insures that the adviser will invest
prudently when the sovereign no longer wishes it to do so for political
reasons. Further, unlike most other funds, SWF's sovereign
beneficiary may decide to step in and change the fund's course
despite the fund manager's expectations and investment trajectory.
For example, China's CIC was thought to have moved to a more
conservative investment track after its high-profile purchase of a
major stake in private equity firm Blackstone. 6 ° Indeed, Lou Jiwei,
the fund's manager, chairman, stated publicly on November 29, 2007
that the fund would invest primarily in index products,26 and that
investments in banks (like the investments by petrodollar SWs)
were probably a year away.262 Yet, less than a month later, the fund
invested $5 billion in Morgan Stanley, in a move that was
characterized by the press as "an abrupt shift in strategy for the $200
billion fund that underlines the extent to which the government fund
appears to be under the direct control of China's leaders. 2 63 Reports
259. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 404(a).
260. Rick Carew, China's Sovereign Wealth Fund Forges Strategy, Hunts for Staff,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2007, at A14 (noting that CIC's managers suggested such a
conservative investment strategy would follow the "initial bold stroke" of the Blackstone
purchase). Carew also argued that the decision of China's social security fund to hire ten
fund managers to control one billion dollars in overseas funds pointed toward this new
conservative strategy. Id.
261. Keith Bradsher, Morgan Investment Marks Shift for China Fund, DEALBOOK,
Dec. 19, 2007, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/19/morgan-investment-marks-
shift-for-china-fund/.
262. Jamil Anderlini, China Fund Looks to Mideast as Model, FIN. TIMES (London),
Nov. 29, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ae7ec63c-9ead-lldc-b4e4-
0000779 fd2ac.html.
263. Bradsher, supra note 261.
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indicate that .the fund's management was surprised by the
government's investment decision.2"
The Santiago Principles do not suggest a structure for SWFs, nor
suggest that SWFs must use external money managers. Instead,
GAPP 6 states that "[t]he governance framework for the SWF should
be sound and establish a clear and effective division of roles and
responsibilities in order to facilitate accountability and operational
independence, ' 61 and GAPP subprinciple 18.2 states that "[t]he
investment policy should address the extent to which internal and/or
external investment managers are used, the range of their activities
and authority, and the process by which they are selected and their
performance monitored. '266  Further, GAPP 14 of the Santiago
Principles also calls on SWFs to deal with third parties such as
"commercial fund managers and custodians, or external service
providers ' 267 on "economic and financial grounds," and to "follow
clear rules and procedures. "268
The Santiago Principles contain little governance guidance for
SWFs, instead functioning as perhaps only a signaling device that the
SWFs of the sponsor-nation drafters will be "structured so that [they
are] able to exercise effective, independent, and objective judgment
in respect of its responsibilities,, 269 and will "establish a clear policy of
a minimum standard of competency for governing body members. "270
While the Santiago Principles may seem weak with respect to fund
governance principles, governance structures should be viewed as
means rather than ends. Setting out specific one-size-fits-all
governance structures for funds, given the variations in size,
objectives and roles of SWFs, could be counterproductive because it
could create an overreliance on form.
Structure provides assurance in form but not necessarily
function. Traditional fund structure is designed in relation to a set of
regulations applicable in the market or markets in which the fund
operates and to a lesser extent, practice principles in the shadow of
such regulations.27' When such regulations no longer apply, the
264. A "person familiar with the fund's activities said that the decision had been
sudden and little expected by the fund's staff." Id.
265. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 7, 15.
266. Id. at 8 (quoting GAPP subprinciple 18.2).
267. Id. at 19 (citing GAPP principle 14's explanation and commentary).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 16.
270. Id.
271. See ROZANOV, supra note 29, at 1.
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structure no longer provides any guarantees. As a result, SWF
structure is less relevant than regulations designed to directly address
undesirable SWF activity for purposes of mitigating risk to capital
markets. 272 However, disclosure of structures and management, as
provided in the Santiago Principles, should at a minimum assist
regulators in their monitoring functions by clarifying lines and scope
of authority within the SWF.
2. Risk Management
There are two general types of economic risk that arise as
sovereigns become more active in capital markets. The first is the
systemic risk created by the influx of capital caused by large SWF
investments. If trillions in trade-imbalance revenues are converted
back into equity investments, undoubtedly some of these funds will
not be allocated to their best use. Thus far, SWFs' U.S. investments
have been in large companies in liquid trading markets. Likewise,
traditional funds are also investing in these same companies because
in some cases the fund is tied to an index or, more typically, because
the fund prefers to acquire more liquid assets because they will be
able to more easily adjust their positions. Will increased investment
activities by SWFs, combined with existing institutional investor
preferences, raise asset prices to unsustainable levels? 273
The second type of risk concerns SWF and sovereign-specific
risks. Examples include unhedged currency risks and the risk that a
sovereign would drain the SWF because of an economic or political
exigency. Some of the SWF-specific risks are no different than the
sorts of risks encountered and managed by other types of funds.
Again, we would expect an appropriately managed SWF to mitigate
many of these risks. However, even if many, if not all, the SWF-
specific risks (such as currency risks) are hedged, some sovereign-
specific risks may not be hedged. Instead, the SWF is, in fact, the
sovereign's hedge against such risks. 274
SWF and sovereign-specific risks create risks to other investors
in the marketplace. How would companies and markets weather the
272. There are many reasons, such as a reduction in agency costs, why a robust
governance structure is desirable. However, in this Article, I am primarily concerned with
the effect of SWFs in the capital markets rather than the proper form of SWF governance.
273. See FARRELL ET AL., supra note 43, at 60 (cautioning that although SWF
investments have contributed to the global market, risk reassessments associated with
SWFs could adversely affect the economy).
274. See generally ROZANOV, supra note 29 (discussing the use of "stabilization" funds
to protect against the sovereign's macroeconomic risks).
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shock of a quick exit (which may or may not be politically motivated)
by a sovereign entity? A sovereign may need to pull its cash out of
investments for a variety of reasons (currency support, war, expanded
social programs, etc.) that may not be relevant to an institutional
investor in a foreign domicile.
The Santiago Principles are limited in their ability to respond to
all of the risks associated with SWF investment in public markets,
although they mitigate some of these risks. The Santiago Principles
address market risks created by SWFs in GAPP 4, which states that
"[tihere should be clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules,
procedures, or arrangements in relation to the SWFs general
approach to funding, withdrawal, and spending operations on behalf
of the government." '275 GAPP 3 also states that "[w]here the SWF's
activities have significant direct domestic macroeconomic
implications, those activities should be closely coordinated with the
domestic fiscal and monetary authorities, so as to ensure consistency
with the overall macroeconomic policies." '276  Internal risk
management of the SWF is covered under GAPP 22, which state that
"[t]he SWF should have a framework that identifies, assesses, and
manages the risks of its operations., 277 The rules are designed to
increase predictability, but will likely not provide much assurance to
other market participants because SWFs by their nature create risks
that private investors do not. Linkage to the government (as called
for in GAPP 3) is in this respect a potential risk to the market. For
example, would SWFs, as part of a coordinated government policy,
quickly remove funds from U.S. investments in order to respond to a
domestic credit crisis?
3. Transparency
A number of commentators and politicians have expressed
concerns with the lack of transparency of SVFs. 278 "Transparency"
for SWFs is generally understood to mean detailed disclosure of such
things as investment purpose, results, and holdings. On this
measurement, in Chairman Cox's opinion, "the track record to date
275. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 7, 13.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 9, 23.
278. See, e.g., Steven R. Weisman, 'Sovereign Funds' Stir Growing Unease, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Aug. 21, 2007, at 4 (noting that members of the Bush administration,
including Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Jr., and German's Chancellor Angela
Merkel, have expressed concern about the effects of SWFs).
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of most sovereign wealth funds does not inspire confidence. 2 79 On
the other hand, SWF managers have expressed concern with Western
notions of transparency. Bader Al-Sa'ad, manager of Kuwait's $200
billion SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority, says that: "We are
concerned about what they mean when they call for transparency.
Do we have to announce every investment before we make it? 2 10 A
similar concern was expressed by Lou Jiwei, manager of China's CIC:
"We will increase transparency without harming the commercial
interests of CIC. That is to say it will be a gradual process.
Transparency is really a tough issue. If we are transparent on
everything, the wolves will eat us up. '"281 On the other hand, the
failure to operate transparently will continue to draw the attention of
regulators and encourage protectionist responses from host countries.
Because China has political and economic power that dwarfs most
other SWF countries,282 encouraging China to operate transparently is
a primary concern for host countries. A sympathetic organization,
the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"), has also encouraged China
and other Asian SWFs to "free themselves of government
interference and become more transparent, 23 reasoning that "it may
be in countries' self-interest to voluntarily take steps that address
legitimate fears and reduce the risk of being singled out for special
treatment." 284
Much of the resistance to the transparency demanded by
Western host nations may be explained by its association with
Western political systems. Levels of transparency appear to correlate
with political traditions of the sovereign. The transparency offered by
Norway's SWF, for example, seems to flow from a commitment to
transparency as a social and political value rather than a desire to
279. Cox, supra note 62.
280. Henry Sender, KIA Chief Focuses on Long-term Opportunities, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2008, at 20.
281. Martin Arnold, China Fund Chief Warns on National Security, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2007, at 4.
282. The CIA WORLD FACTBOOK notes, for instance, that China now has the second
largest economy in the world on a purchasing power parity basis. CIA, THE WORLD
FACrBOOK 2007, at 125, available at https://www.cia.gov/librarylpublications/the-world-
factbook/ geos/ch.html.
283. Raphael Minder, ADB Calls for Transparency of Asia Funds, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ft.comlcms/s/0/a818b6d8-9c67-lldc-bcd8-0000779
fd2ac.html?nclick check=l.
284. Id. (quoting Donghyun Park, Beyond Liquidity: New Uses for Developing Asia's
Foreign Exchange Reserves 34 (Asian Devt. Bank, Econ. and Research Dep't, Working
Paper No. 109, 2007)), available at http://www.adb.org/DocumentsfERD/Working-Papersl
WP109.pdf).
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avoid further regulation by host nations. In the investment of funds
for the benefit of citizens, such as state pension plans, representative-
democracies typically have a tradition of regulating themselves as
fiduciaries to their citizens. U.S. government-run pension plans, for
example, provide disclosures similar to private fiduciaries, in contrast
to, for example, China, which does not require such disclosures. 285
When a country does not have a tradition of transparency in its
political governance, calls for transparency are likely to meet with
strong resistance. 286 The concept of fiduciary-type disclosure, which
appears to be the expectation attached to transparency, may be a
concept that for many sovereigns seems bound up with
representative-democratic political systems.
Concerns with transparency may be compounded when SWFs
invest in asset managers that are themselves not transparent. Where
hedge funds and public equity firms are not required under current
regulations to disclose information about their major investors, other
investors will not be able to evaluate the activities of SWFs. If SWFs
begin to exploit hedge funds as investment vehicles, then the
justifications for a laissez-faire attitude with respect to hedge fund
activity may need to be reevaluated. Perhaps more benignly, some
also see investment in asset managers as a means to acquire
intellectual capital that will help SWFs become even more
sophisticated investors.288
What basic information would constitute reasonable and fair
disclosure for SWFs? One "scoreboard" for SWF transparency,
presenting a U.S.-type disclosure model, suggests SWFs should
provide the following:
* A quarterly reports on its activities;
* The size of the fund;
* Information on the returns it earns;
* Information on the types of investments-for example,
in what sectors and in what instruments;
* Information on the geographic location of investments;
285. Stuart Leckie & Ning Pan, Editorial, China's Emerging Pensions Giant, WALL ST.
J. (ASIA), Dec. 5, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1165271869168
40408.html?mod=djemasialinks.
286. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., supra note 234, at
13, 147 (discussing resistance to the transparency provisions of the MAI).
287. See Sender, supra note 280.
288. See Managers Run 44% of Sovereign Wealth Assets, PENSIONS & INV., March 7,
2008, http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dlllarticle?AID=/20080307/DAILY/762550071.
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" Information on the specific investments-in which
instruments, countries, and companies;
* Information on the currency composition of
investments;
" Identity of holders of investment mandates, e.g.,
investment advisers;
• Whether the SWF is subjected to a regular audit;
* Whether the audit is published; and
* Whether the audit is independent. 289
Another model of adequate disclosure provided by a UK
consulting firm offers a comply-or-explain set of transparency
guidelines for private equity firms. 9' The firm has further
encouraged sovereign wealth funds to sign.29' The guidelines offer
standards for both SWFs and for companies that compose the SWFs
portfolio. SWFs are encouraged to provide a discussion of their
histories, management, investment approaches and strategic changes,
and to disclose investments, returns, valuation procedures, holding
periods, and case studies of investment activities. SWFs are also
encouraged to insure compliance of portfolio companies with
applicable regulations.292 Among other things, portfolio companies
are encouraged to identify controlling ownership, including
individuals.293
Finally, the EU has also set out several principles that SWFs
could consider in creating a voluntary disclosure regime, including:
0 Annual disclosure of investment positions and asset
allocation, in particular for investments for which there
is majority ownership;
* Exercise of ownership rights;
* Disclosure of the use of leverage and of the currency
composition;
289. EDWIN M. TRUMAN, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON., THE MANAGEMENT OF
CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL RESERVES: CHINA AND A SWF SCOREBOARD 24-26, (2007),
available at www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/trumanl007.pdf.
290. DAVID WALKER, GUIDELINES FOR DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY IN
PRIVATE EQUITY 24 (2007), available at http://www.altassets.com/pdfs/wwg-report-
final.pdf.
291. Siobhan Kennedy, Call to Bring Sovereign Wealth Funds and Entrepreneurs Under
Private Equity Code, THE TIMES (UK), Nov. 20, 2007, at 51, available at
http:/[business.timesonline.co.uk/to/business/money/funds/article2903698.ece.
292. See WALKER, supra note 290, at 41 (noting that achievement of high standards of
conduct supports private equity as a whole).
293. See id.
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* Size and source of an entity's resources;
* Disclosure of the home country regulation and
oversight governing the SWF 94
As discussed above, disclosures that meet many of these
guidelines currently apply to shareholders with greater than a five
percent stake in U.S. reporting companies under section 13 of the
Exchange Act,295 but not all countries have similar guidelines. Most
SWF investments will fall under this threshold. Such disclosures
assist in enforcement by monitoring agencies such as CFIUS and the
SEC, but are also valuable to other investors (including other SWFs)
who are concerned with whether and how SWF investment may
affect the company.
The Santiago Principles call for increased transparency through
basic disclosures, such as "[a]n annual report and accompanying
financial statements on the SWF's operations and performance
should be prepared in a timely fashion and in accordance with
recognized international or national accounting standards in a
consistent manner." '296 The Santiago Principles also call for audits in
accordance with "recognized international or national auditing
standards." '297 However, the Santiago Principles also fall well short of
the disclosures offered by very transparent SWFs such as Norway's.
For example, the Santiago Principles call for disclosure of generally
asset allocation, but do not call for SWFs to disclose their individual
investment positions.
Another important aspect of transparency for SWFs is
investment policy. The Santiago Principles repeatedly call for SWFs
to disclose investment policy in an effort to provide assurance that
they are investing for economic and financial reasons.298 However,
the Santiago Principles again fall short of providing the assurance
they should by not condemning non-commercial investment. Instead,
the Santiago Principles state that "[i]f investment decisions are
subject to other than economic and financial considerations, these
294. Commission Proposal for a Common European Approach to Sovereign Wealth
Funds, supra note 248, at 11.
295. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2008) (requiring the filing of a Schedule 13D). These
are also known as beneficial ownership reports; U.S Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Schedule 13D,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/schedl3.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
296. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 8, 17 (citing GAPP principle 11).
297. Id. at 8, 18 (citing GAPP principle 12).
298. Id. at 8 (referencing GAPP sub-principles 18.3 and 19.1).
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should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be publicly
disclosed. , 29
9
4. Accountability
To paraphrase Justice Frankfurter, to say that SWFs must be
"accountable" only begins the analysis."° To whom is the SWF
accountable? What obligations does the SWF owe as a result, and
what are the consequences if the SWF deviates from these
obligations?
The SWF is not accountable in the same way as most other large
funds. Unlike funds managed by most institutional investors, which
are regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,301 SWFs do
not owe fiduciary duties to identifiable beneficiaries. In some cases,
depending on the goals of the fund, it is not clear who such
beneficiaries would be-perhaps all citizens of Country X, or certain
citizens such as pensioners? In any event there is likely no legal
framework within the sovereign with which to hold SWFs
accountable as fiduciaries even if beneficiaries were identified.
Accountability is thus primarily political, rather than flowing from
fiduciary duties.
Accountability and transparency are closely related, since
transparency is a prerequisite to accountability. If the fund operates
transparently, it becomes more difficult for a SWF manager to avoid
questions about whether to invest in companies that pollute, produce
dangerous and controversial products or services, or do business with
pariah nations (assuming the citizens are, as Norway's, concerned
with such issues)."
The Santiago Principles address accountability issues in several
places. With respect to host-country enforcement issues, GAPP 15
states that "SWF operations and activities in host countries should be
conducted in compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
299. Id. at 8, 22.
300. In a frequently-quoted passage, Justice Frankfurter stated,
To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?
In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty?
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
301. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).
302. See Acher, supra note 210 (recognizing that Norwegian citizens are concerned
with such issues).
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requirements of the countries in which they operate,"3 °3 and GAPP
20 states that "[t]he SWF should not seek or take advantage of
privileged information or inappropriate influence by the broader
government in competing with private entities. '3 °4  Internal
accountability is addressed in GAPP 10, which states that SWF
should create an accountability framework in "relevant legislation,
charter, other constitutive documents, or management agreement.""3 '
Yet, the fact that many SWFs are products of regimes that are not
democratic begs the question of whether internal political
accountability exists for the mismanagement of many SWFs.
On the other hand, SWFs and their sovereign owners are subject
to potential external political accountability in the same sense that a
sovereign is politically accountable for other types of activities
implicating foreign sovereign entities. However, a major difference
between SWF activity and other types of economic activity among
sovereigns, such as tariff disputes, is that there are international
dispute resolution procedures to manage disagreement among
sovereigns over these other economic activities. Unfair trade
practices are regulated through procedures set out in the World
Trade Organization agreements3 6 which were negotiated among
nations and ratified by the countries' respective legislative bodies. By
contrast, the issues raised by sovereign wealth fund investment are
dealt with by each country either through its own legislation or
through a variety of regulatory schemes. Thus, to help avoid the
possibility of political dispute resulting from SWF investment,
sovereign sponsors and host countries should begin to address dispute
resolution procedures for sovereign investment. Also, as noted
above, many host nations may not be able to protect themselves
without such a mechanism. Even for developed economies, like the
United States, that may possess the political and economic clout to
punish another sovereign for the political use of a SWF, hasty
political retribution is unlikely to produce an optimal political or
economic outcome. Further, the economic and political power on
which such retribution depends becomes increasingly fragile as SWFs
gain more economic power through our capital markets. Economic
303. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 32, at 8, 19.
304. Id. at 8, 22.
305. Id. at 8, 17.
306. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1144 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto.pdf
(establishing the WTO's structure and relations among its members).
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power correlates with political power,3 °7 and the political checks on
SWFs become weaker as SWFs become more prominent financial
patrons of U.S. enterprise. A handful of investments of valued at
several billion dollars may be easily moderated within capital markets
valued at nearly $22 trillion.3 8 But trillions of dollars of SWF
investments, even if representing widely dispersed, minority
positions, would strain the ability of CFIUS and other regulators to
monitor SWF activity.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues for a holistic approach in considering the
appropriate regulation of SWFs. While this Article argues that SWFs
will be limited in their ability to act politically through their equity
investments in U.S. markets, this analysis does not suggest that SWFs
are beyond suspicion. The more limited argument presented here is
that a variety of regulatory, economic, and political factors provide
assurance that equity investment in U.S. firms is not an ideal or even
likely political tool. However, SWFs may invest in less-regulated
equity markets, and equity investments are only one of many form of
investment available to SWFs. Other types of strategic investment,
such as the purchase of vital commodity producers or reserves, have
the ability to affect U.S. security interests more drastically than SWF
activity in the United States. While the U.S. may be able to protect
its interests against such activity, its ability to protect its interests
should be enhanced by the voluntary adoption of the Santiago
Principles (and those dealing with transparency, in particular) by
SWFs. The Santiago Principles also provide some protection against
risks to the U.S. though SWF investment in other countries, although
the Santiago Principles remain deficient in a number of respects.
This Article does not address the larger problem that gave rise to
SWFs-the massive trade imbalance between the U.S. and most of
the SWF-sponsor countries. As Warren Buffett memorably noted in
307. See PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC
CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000, at xxii (1987).
308. FED. RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS
AND OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 2007, at 90 (2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/2O080306/zl.pdf (citing statistics on corporate
equity issuances at market value in 2007).
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his 2004 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders,3 °9 writing on the
U.S.'s current account deficit,
[a]s time passes, and as claims against us grow, we own less and
less of what we produce. In effect, the rest of the world enjoys
an ever-growing royalty on American output. Here, we are like
a family that consistently overspends its income. As time
passes, the family finds that it is working more and more for the
"finance company" and less for itself.... This annual royalty
paid the world - which would not disappear unless the U.S.
massively underconsumed and began to run consistent and
large trade surpluses - would undoubtedly produce significant
political unrest in the U.S. Americans would still be living very
well, indeed better than now because of the growth in our
economy. But they would chafe at the idea of perpetually
paying tribute to their creditors and owners abroad. A country
that is now aspiring to an "Ownership Society" will not find
happiness in - and I'll use hyperbole here for emphasis - a
"Sharecropper's Society." But that's precisely where our trade
policies, supported by Republicans and Democrats alike, are
taking us. 310
While leaving to others the subject of the growing current
account deficit, our current ability to regulate the negative effects of
SWF investments, without any further international effort, perhaps
only buys us time to address the factors that created SWFs.
Continued attention to and research on the effects of SWFs is
essential, particularly on their proxy voting behavior and quality of
disclosures. SWF investment must be viewed as part of a larger
discussion of the political consequences of capital flows. In
particular, China's SWF activity is one of many complex policy issues
that should be addressed within a larger, comprehensive discussion of
U.S.-China economic relations.
This Article also does not address many of the effects of the rise
of state capitalism, except as they relate to equity investment in the
United States. The analysis in this Article implies that state
capitalists will likely be forced to play by the rules of market
capitalism if they choose to invest in Western markets. However,
with the increase in the number of SWFs, with countries such as India
and Japan also indicating that they may create SWFs, and with the
309. Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc.,
to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 20 (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20041tr.pdf.
310. Id.
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not-quite-dead possibility that U.S. social security funds may be
invested in equity markets, " we may yet see the day when SWFs are
viewed not merely as commercial tools, but also as economic and
political tools used by all sovereigns in the normal course of
international affairs.
311. See On The Issues, Barack Obama on Social Security, http://www.ontheissues.org/
2008/BarackObamaSocialSecurity.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008) (noting that Barack
Obama rejects calls for the privatization of social security).
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